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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 
STRUGGLE FOR PROBATE REFORM 
Richard V. Wellman* 
The two Als being honored by this issue have honored me with 
years of precious friendship and many words a!!-d acts of support and 
encouragement. In return, they and their friends and others who 
may peruse these pages prepared as they near retirement really de-
serve better reading than can be expected of an article that wallows 
in the dreadful details of legislation dealing with probate procedure. 
Conard and Smith are old hands when it comes to efforts at im-
provement of law and legal institutions. They know better than to 
immerse themselves deeply in a piece like the one that follows, real-
izing that what is developed here will make sense, if at all, only to a 
relatively small audience of lawyers who will play some role in re-
shaping a legal institution that has been allowed to become an em-
barrassment to the nation's legal community. Others less 
experienced may be forewarned. This Article describes some of the 
last decade's moments of progress and defeat for a movement, now 
extended to more than thirty years, to improve probate law. The 
University of Michigan Law School and the Michigan Law Review, 
with which Alfred F. Conard and Allan F. Smith have had long and 
distinguished associations, have played large roles in this movement. 
INTRODUCTION 
Spurred by a surge of citizen complaints about inheritance laws, 1 
many states adopted new probate legislation during the 1970s. The 
complaints arose from excessive costs and delays2 - consequences 
of an American tradition that settlement of estates, somewhat like 
bankruptcy, normally involves court supervision. The states' re-
• Robert Cotton Alston Professor of Law, University of Georgia; Educational Director, 
Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code. A.B. 1947, J.D. 1949, University of 
Michigan.- Ed. 
I. See, e.g., N. DACEY, How TO AVOID PROBATE (1965); Bloom, The Mess in Our Probate 
Courts, READERS DIG., Oct. 1966, at 102; Nuccio,HowtoAvoida Costly Probate, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 14, 1966, at 65, col. 3; Morgan, The Probate Fuss, LOOK, Nov. 29, 1966, at 36; Myers, 
Probing the Source of Probate Pains, Wall St. J., May 14, 1968, at 18, col. 3; Let's Rewrite the 
Probate Laws, CHANGING TIMES, Jan. 1969, at 39. 
2. In P. STERN, LAWYERS ON TRIAL 33 (1980), the author, citing Fratcher, Fiduciary Ad-
ministration in England, 40 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 12 (1965), states that "probate expenses in the 
United States are as much as one hundred times what they are in England." 
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sponse was to change the procedures by which wills are made eff ec-
tive and estates of decedents are opened, administered, and settled. 
Several legislatures adopted spot corrections for some of the more 
notorious burdens of court control of estates; for example, some 
raised the maximum value of estates eligible for distribution without 
compliance with normal routines, some eliminated or relaxed estate 
appraisal requirements, others shortened the period during which 
wills can be contested and claims can be presented, and still others 
eliminated hearings that were formerly required. Many other legis-
latures adopted the Uniform Probate Code (UPC)3 and its premise 
that most estates should be settled without court adjudication or su-
pervision. Finally, many states added optional procedures that pur-
port to off er successors new autonomy from traditional court 
controls. 
In Part I, this Article notes that the bulk of recent probate proce-
dure legislation reduces court control of estates. The Article restates 
the case in favor of this trend.4 It then identifies UPC details that 
place full control of an estate in the person named by the testator or 
by the apparent successors to the estate - referred to here as testa-
tor-successor control of estates. Because it currently appears to be 
politically impossible to enact the UPC in some states, the Article 
identifies and evaluates various issues that confront legislators inter-
ested in compromise laws that further the principle of testator-suc-
cessor control of estates while retaining supervised administration as 
the norm. 
Against this background, Part II analyzes recent statutes in Mich-
igan, Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, Missouri, Kansas, and the District 
of Columbia that offer new, optional estate settlement procedures 
that purport to reduce traditional court control of estates. This dis-
cussion emphasizes the background and content of the District of 
Columbia Probate Reform Act of 1980, a statute that demonstrates 
how efforts to move toward testator-successor control of estates may 
backfire and increase court control. It also notes that three of the 
other six enactments analyzed - those in Indiana, Missouri, and 
3. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, 5th ed., 1977 (West 1977) (hereinafter cited as UPC without 
cross-reference]. 
4. See w. FRATCHER, PROBATE CAN BE QUICK AND CHEAP: TRUSTS AND EsTATES IN 
ENGLAND (1968); Basye, l)ispensing With Administration, 44 MICH. L. REV. 329 (194S), re-
printed in L. SIMES & P. BASYE, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW S57 (1946); Fletcher, Washing-
ton's Non-Intervention Executor-Starting Point far Probate Simplification, 41 WASH. L. REV, 33 
(1966); Wellman, The Un!form Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the JO's, 2 CONN, L. 
REV. 4S3 (1970). 
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Kansas - appear to be devoid of promise of reduced costs for estate 
beneficiaries. 
Finally, in Part Ill, the Article suggests that the UPC and the 
probate law reform effort should expand to include an additional, 
optional procedure for settling decedents' estates that would function 
without appointment of a conventional probate :fiduciary. Universal 
succession (or succession without administration), the Article sug-
gests, may off er testators and their successors a simpler and less eas-
ily sabotaged route than does unsupervised administration to escape 
conventional court-supervised administration of probate estates. 
I. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION: PRINCIPLES 
AND COMPROMISE 
A. The Testator-Successor Control Principle 
The promulgation of the UPC, with its radical and, to some, 
threatening elimination of traditional court controls of succession 
procedure, precipitated a nationwide debate about whether more or 
less court supervision of decedents' estates would meet the public's 
criticisms of American probate law.5 The result has been a deluge of 
new laws affecting probate procedure. Most attempt to simplify the 
procedures or shorten waiting periods found in typical laws that rely 
on court supervision of estates. Thirteen states have adopted the 
UPC or its major procedural premise.6 In addition, new Texas7 and 
5. See STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE: ANALYSIS AND CRI-
TIQUE (1973); Haviland, Shall We Rebuild Our House of Probate?, 19 U. KAN. L. REV. 575 
(1971); Kratochvil, The Uniform Probate Code: Repent at Leisure, REAL EsT. PROB. & TR. L. 
SECTION, KAN. B.A. NEWSLETTER, (Spring 1973); Laing, IJoes Kansas Need the Uniform Pro-
bate Code?, 1973 J. KAN. B.A. 139; Zartman, AN ILLINOIS CRITIQUE OF THE UNIFORM PRO-
BATE CODE, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 413 (1971). 
6. The Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code counts Alaska, Arizona, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Pennyslvania, and Utah as states that have adopted the major provisions of the Uniform 
Probate Code. See JOINT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, UPC NOTES 
No. 8, at 1 (July 1974) (reporting the enactments in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Minne-
sota, Montana, Nebraska and North Dakota) [hereinafter cited as UPC NoTEs]; UPC NOTES 
No. 12, at l (June 1975) (reporting enactment in Utah); UPC NOTES No. 13, at I (Sept. 1975) 
(New Mexico); UPC NOTES No. 22, at l (1978) (New Jersey); UPC NOTES No. 23, at I (March 
1979) (Pennsylvania); UPC NOTES No. 24, at l (Oct. 1979) (Maine). The New Jersey and 
Pennsylvania versions of the UPC were built upon prior procedures that already respected the 
principle of testator-successor control. 
7. Section 145 of the Texas Probate Code recognized independent administr.ation only for 
estates governed by wills directing that the probate court shall not intervene in the affairs of 
the executor. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 145 (Vernon 1979). An amendment, effective 
Sept. 1, 1977, extended§ 145 to estates governed by wills that do not expressly deal with the 
question of independent or supervised administration, and to intestate estates. Act of June 15, 
1977, ch. 390, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 1061 (codified at TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 145). The 
new procedure is available only when the court is satisfied, on the basis of "clear and convinc-
ing evidence," that those requesting independent administration as the intestate heirs consti-
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Washington8 laws permit some form of unsupervised administration 
for intestate estates, and California,9 Florida, 10 Hawaii, 11 Iowa, 12 
tute all of the heirs. Section 145(g). The heirs acting collectively must designate a qualified 
person, firm, or corporation to serve as independent administrator. Section 145(e). The court 
of probate is empowered to deny an application for independent administration if it deter-
mines that it would not be in the best interests of the estate. An independent administrator 
must file with the probate court an inventory appraisement and list of claims against the estate. 
8. Act of Feb. 19, 1974, ch. 117, 1974 Wash. Laws 284 (effective Oct. I, 1974) (codified at 
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 11.68.010-.120 (1978 Supp.)). The Washington act amended 
§ 11.68.010 and following sections to extend Washington's nonintervention will procedure to 
intestate estates and to estates governed by wills that do not expressly deal with court supervi-
sion of the fiduciary. No notice to heirs is necessary if the personal representative, as qualified 
or identified by standard priority provisions, is the surviving spouse of the decedent and no 
issue of the decedent by a prior marriage survive, or if the personal representative is a bank or 
trust company with authority to do business as a trustee in the state. WASH. Rev. CODE ANN. 
§ I l.68.040. The court must determine that the estate is solvent on the basis of the petition, an 
inventory, or other proof. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.68.01. 
9. Independent Administration of Estates Act, ch. 961, 1974 Cal. Stats. 2001 (codified at 
CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 591-591.7 (West Supp. 1980)). The enactment, effective July I, 1975, 
which does nothing to facilitate opening or closing of California estates, describes a procedure 
by which a California executor or administrator (where the will does not provide to the con-
trary) may gain certain listed powers which may be exercised without court order after pre-
scribed warnings of intended exercise have been given to interested persons. See Spitler, Un-
Uniform Probate: The Cal!fornia Version, UPC NOTES No. 14, at I (Dec. 1975) (describing the 
statute as "mangled by three years of give and take in the legislative process," and predicting 
that "the California public will continue to use inter vivos trusts, joint tenancies, and other 
devices to avoid the entire court-supervised probate process." 
10. Florida Probate Code, ch. 74-106, 1974 Fla. Laws 212 (codified as FLA. STAT, 
§§ 731.01-735 (1975)). The procedural aspects of this enactment have been described as fol-
lows: 
The 1974 Code offers interested parties four possible ways of proceeding with the set-
tlement of a decedent's estate. Several of these alternatives, however, are severely re-
stricted by limitations on the size or nature of the property within the estate. As a result, 
the new Code is far from the "flexible system of administration" advocated by the drafts-
men of the UPC. The legislative rejection of this system, and the resulting retention of 
close court supervision over the acts of the personal representative, evidences the pater-
nalistic attitude that has long characterized the probate laws of this country. Because this 
decision fails to meet the demands for reduced court supervision, it constitutes the greatest 
weakness in the 1974 Code and almost certainly will promote demand for further reform 
of our probate laws. Nevertheless, some progress has been made and, hopefully, the foun-
dation laid for greater flexibility in the future. 
Fenn & Koren, The 1974 Florida Probate Code-A Marriage of Convenience, 27 U. FLA. L. 
REV. 615, 627-28 (1975). 
The new Florida law eliminates court-appointed appraisers but continues to require that an 
inventory of estate assets be filed with the court in all cases involving a conventional probate 
administration. FLA. STAT.§ 733.605 (1975). Also, the new law gives personal representatives 
broad statutory powers of administration except as to real property, § 733.613, and includes 
provisions based on the UPC for protecting persons dealing with personal representatives and 
their distributees. Sections 733.6211, .813. A final court accounting is still required. Section 
733.901. 
11. Uniform Probate Code, 1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws 372 (codified at 30A HAWAII Rev. 
STAT. ch. 560 (1976)). Under the Hawaiian version of the UPC, informal probate and appoint-
ment proceedings, and unsupervised administration, are available only for estates of $30,000 
or less in value. HAWAII REV. STAT.§ 560:3-:301 (1976). Formal proceedings and supervised 
administration are mandatory for all other estates. Section 560:3-501. The degree of court 
supervision involved in a supervised administration in Hawaii is limited; court orders are re-
quired for final distributions only, unless other restrictions on the fiduciary's power are en-
dorsed on the letters of authority. Section 560:3-504. However, an inventory must be filed 
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Kentucky, 13 Ohio, 14 Oregon, 15 and South Dakota 16 have new codes 
with the appointing court in all estates, including those being administered in informal pro-
ceedings, § 560:3-706, and a final accounting to the court and a court order of distribution are 
required of all estates in supervised administration. See§§ 560:3-505, 3-1001. Statutory pow-
ers of administration as recommended by the UPC are granted to all Hawaiian personal repre-
sentatives, but judicial proceedings to confirm estate sales of real property are required. See 
§§ 560:3-715, 531-29. 
12. Act of July 9, 1977, ch. 145, § 4, 1977 Iowa Acts 459 (codified at IOWA CODE§ 633.479 
(Supp. 1980)). The amendment became effective on Jan. l, 1978. An order approving the final 
report of a personal representative and discharging the personal representative is no longer 
necessary where all distributees are competent adults who have signed waivers of notice and 
statements of consent to the final report. Requirements that a full accounting of the adminis-
tration be filed with the court may be waived. low A CODE§ 633.477 (1964). The amendment 
to § 633.470 is the most significant procedural change in Iowa since promulgation of the Uni-
form Probate Code, but Iowa procedures, as prescribed by a carefully prepared and forward-
looking code enacted in 1963, had already left the court with little control of estates other than 
to determine fees for attorneys' services. 
13. Act of March 30, 1976, ch. 218, § 24, 1976 Ky. Acts 482 (codified at KY. REV. STAT. 
§ 395.195 (Supp. 1980)), confers statutory powers (not including a power to sell land) on per-
sonal representatives. KY. REV. STAT. § 395.605(2) (Supp. 1980) authorizes informal settle-
ments of testate and intestate estates previously opened for administration. Informal 
settlements involve a sworn application to the district court by the fiduciary accompanied by 
verified waivers executed by all beneficiaries. The court is directed to accept an application if 
all beneficiaries are competent adults and may accept an application if minors or incompetents 
are involved. Acceptance of an informal settlement, which cannot be filed until the time pe-
riod for filing claims has passed and all death taxes have been paid, dispenses with court 
accounting requirements. This act also added most of UPC articles VI (nonprobate transfers) 
and VII (trust administration) to Kentucky law. See KY. REV. STAT. §§ 386.650-386.845 & 
39 l.355-391.360. 
14. Act of Aug. 25, 1975, 136 Ohio Laws 326 (1975) amended the Ohio Probate Code and 
related sections in many respects. The most important changes to supervised administration 
are those enabling probate of wills without production of testimony or affidavit of attesting 
witnesses, Omo REV. CODE ANN.§§ 22107.14-.18 (Page Supp. 1980), relaxing estate appraisal 
requirements, § 2115.02, authorizing immediate distribution of estates for which no will con-
test is pending, subject to personal liability of the fiduciary to the extent that values distributed 
are not returned as needed to satisfy creditors' claims, § 2113.53, and enabling successors to file 
consents in court and to confer a power of sale of real estate on an executor or administrator, 
provided that all the successors are adults,§ 2127.011. The power of probate courts to enforce 
requirements of court accounting for all administered estates appears to be increased by 
amendments to § 2101.01 that mandate county financial support for "accountants, financial 
consultants and. other agents required for auditing or financial consulting by the probate divi-
sion whenever the probate judge considers these services and expenditures necessary for the 
efficient performance of the division's duties." 
15. Oregon Probate Code, ch. 591, 1969 Or. Laws 1121 (effective July l, 1970) (codified at 
OR. REV. STAT.§§ lll.005-117.095 (1979)) made Oregon law similar to the UPC in many 
respects. Opening procedures, governed by chapter 113, may be conducted without advance 
notice to interested persons. Under chapter 114, personal representatives of testate and intes-
tate estates have broad fiduciary powers to manage, encumber, sell or otherwise affect assets, 
including land, as necessary to accomplish the purposes of administration. Purchasers from 
personal representatives are relieved of inquiry concerning fiduciary powers and are protected 
as bona fide purchasers if they are without actual knowledge of breach by the fiduciary. The 
principal differences between the UPC and Oregon procedures lie in Oregon's court account-
ing and distribution procedures which are mandatory for all administered estates. See OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 116.030, 116.083 (1979). See generally Mapp, The 1969 Oregon Probate Code 
and Due Process, 49 OR. L. REV. 345 (1970). 
16. Act oflndependent Administration of Estates with Limited Court Supervision, ch. 176, 
1976 S.D. Sess. Laws 313 (codified at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.§§ 30-18A-l to 30-18A-16). 
The new South Dakota procedure, enacted in conjunction with repeal of the Uniform Probate 
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or recent amendments that enlarge the authority of estate fiduciaries, 
while adhering to the concept of mandatory fiduciary accountability 
to the probate court. Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, 
and Wisconsin have added procedures, discussed in Part II of this 
Article, that purport to off er new opportunities to select independent 
administration as an alternative to supervised administration. An 
important new statute in the District of Columbia, also discussed in 
Part II, includes some reform provisions but takes back much more 
than it gives. Several states, including Delaware, 17 Massachusetts, 18 
Nevada,19 and Wyoming,20 have new probate laws that do little to 
improve probate procedures. 
Code, bears a close resemblance to the California legislation described in note 8. See Well-
man, The VPC .Defeat in South .Dakota, UPC NOTES No. 17, at 5 (Oct. 1976). 
17. Act of June 25, 1974, ch. 384, 59 Del. Laws 1291 (codified in scattered section of 12 
DEL. CoDE ANN. (1974)). As explained in a report circulated a year prior to enactment, the 
procedural objectives of the reform proposal were as follows: 
(I) abolition of the practice which now vests both accounting and judicial functions in 
an elected official; 
(2) vesting all probate jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery; 
(3) delegating administrative functions to an official appointed for that purpose by the 
Court, subject, when necessary, to judicial supervision; 
( 4) a final review of all estate accounts by the Court; notice should be given to parties in 
interest and, if an exception is taken or if the Court or the personal representative 
deems it necessary, a hearing should be held in open Court; 
(5) reduction to writing, by statute and by rule, of the significant aspects of probate 
procedure so they will be known to both the public and the bar; 
(6) providing for a procedure by which determination can be made quickly and inex-
pensively of judicial or quasi-judicial questions which routinely arise in the adminis-
tration of the system. 
Report of Special .Delaware Supreme Court Committee (June 11, 1971), reprinted in SPECIAL 
SUBCOMMITTEE OF DECEDENTS' TRUSTS AND EsTATES COMMITTEE OF DELAWARE BAR Asso-
CIATION, DELAWARE PROBATE CODE REVISION 2 (1973) (on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view). 
18. Act of Oct. 27, 1976, ch. 515, 1976 Mass. Acts 767 (codified in scattered sections of 
MAss. ANN. LAWS chs. 65A, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 197, 199A, 201, 203, 204, 205 (1979)), 
This "omnibus probate bill" is discussed in Young, Probate Change, BOSTON B.J., Dec. 1976, 
at 6, andinProhateLawReform-Massachusetts Style, UPC NOTES No. 20, at 6 (June 1977). 
19. Act of May 28, 1975, ch. 751, 1975 Nev. Stat. 1765 (codified at NEV. Rev. STAT, 
§§ 143.035-.175 (1977)). This probate reform bill, enacted following study of the Uniform 
Probate Code, merely accepted UPC standards regarding estate appraisals, increased small 
estate limitations, and imposed new duties on personal representatives to close estates 
promptly. See UPC NOTES No. 13, at 7 (Sept. 1976). 
20. Following a veto of a UPC bill passed by the Wyoming legislature in 1975, see UPC 
NOTES No. 13, at 7 (Sept. 1975), and a second veto of a similar bill passed by the legislature in 
1977, see UPC NOTES No. 20, at 2 (June 1977), the Wyoming Probate Act, ch. 142, 1979 Wyo. 
Sess. Laws 256 (codified in scattered sections of 2 Wvo. STAT. (Supp. 1980)) - the present 
Wyoming Probate Code - was finally enacted. In an unpublished memorandum addressed to 
the "Governor's Probate Statute Study Committee and other interested persons," Professor 
Lawrence Averill criticized the new code's provisions relating to probate of wills and adminis-
tration of estates as follows: 
Rather than really reducing formality and court involvement, the Code either reenacts it 
or actually increases it in several places. . . . 
Although omissions of material provisions are too numerous to list, the absence of an 
informal, basically courtless, administration procedure for all estates at the election of the 
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Under the UPC, the probate of wills and administration of tes-
tate and intestate estates of decedents do not necessitate use of the 
court system in a conventional adjudicatory role.21 Rather, probate 
offices, presumably the same ones administering probate laws under 
prior law, control a public probate registry that may act administra-
tively to assist estate settlements.22 Application can be made to the 
probate office for probate of a will and appointment of a personal 
representative.23 If the applications appear to be in order, the offi-
cials can issue a statement of probate24 and appoint the applicant as 
personal representative.25 The officials then commence administra-
tion of the probate estate by issuing letters of authority to the per-
sonal representative,26 who then has full control of all the estate 
assets. 27 This completes the procedure for opening the estate. 
At this point, the UPC breaks away from traditional patterns of 
probate procedure that force the personal representative to use law-
yers or to account to the probate office for the administration of es-
tate assets. 
It does not follow, of course, that persons who are damaged by 
abuse of the personal representative's authority are without mean-
ingful recourse or that the personal representative's control is unre-
strained. The UPC imposes criminal and civil penalties for 
intentional misrepresentations in applications for probate or in ap-
plications for appointment as personal representative.28 There are 
also serious liabilities attaching to misuse of control, including full 
fiduciary accountability to the decedent's creditors and successors.29 
These penalties and liabilities can compensate a person who is dam-
aged by abuse of the personal representative's authority. They also 
deter such abuse since would-be personal representatives are likely 
to be forewarned about them; would-be controllers usually consult 
with a lawyer before receiving letters of authority either because a 
probate official withholds or delays applications prepared without a 
interested parties, converts this Code into hollow and insignificant reform. The need for 
such informal, procedures is at the heart of the probate reform movement. 
(On file with the Michigan Law Review.) 
21. See UPC art. III, pt. 3. 
22. See UPC§§ 1-305, -307, 3-105, & art. III, pt. 3. 
23. UPC § 3-301. 
24. UPC § 3-302. 
25. UPC § 3-307. Appointment of the applicant is subject to his qualification and accep-
tance. , 
26. UPC§ 3-103. 
27. See UPC art. III, at 122-23; Wellman, supra note 4, at 488-501. 
28. UPC§§ 1-310, 3-30l(b). 
29. See UPC§§ 3-602, -703, -705, -712, -807(b). 
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lawyer's help, or because of the applicants' natural concern about 
taxes, the sanctions for perjury, and other legal complexities. 
In addition, the UPC restrains personal representatives indirectly 
by limiting who may be a personal representative. The only people 
who automatically qualify to control a testate estate are the executor 
chosen by the will to handle the decedent's affairs or, if no executor 
is chosen or the estate is intestate, the surviving spouse who is also an 
estate beneficiary. If there is no named executor or spouse-benefici-
ary, or if neither seeks authority to control the estate, controllers 
must be selected by all the successors, whether the estate is testate or 
intestate.30 Estate creditors are blocked by the code from reaching 
estate assets before an estate has been opened by issuance of letters 
of authority.31 Nonetheless, they can force an administration and, 
forty-five days after the decedent's death, are eligible to gain control 
if all others mentioned above decline to serve32 and the successors 
refuse to pay their claims voluntarily.33 
The assurance that only persons close to the decedent or his sur-
vivors can control the estate protects against abuse of the authority. 
Personal representatives are restrained by feelings of kinship or 
other association with the successors or the testator. Correlatively, 
creditors and successors know whom they must watch for their own 
protection. If they become dissatisfied with what they see and seek 
legal assistance, they will learn that the UPC provides an array of 
court remedies.34 Family considerations, legal advice, and common 
sense will lead estate fiduciaries and their beneficiaries to satisfac-
tory, out-of-court resolution of most difficulties.35 If responsibility 
for an estate proves to have been misplaced, either by a testator or by 
his successors, the family has only itself to blame. In any event, only 
an expectancy in the decedent's assets is usually at stake; few suffer 
out-of-pocket losses. 
The UPC's testator-successor control of estate settlements will 
benefit and satisfy most persons for several reasons. First, indepen-
30. UPC § 3-203. 
31. UPC§ 3-104. 
32. UPC §§ 3-203(a)(6), 1-201(20), 3-308. 
33. Except as a possible creditor or heir, the state does not have standing to force estate 
settlement on successors. See UPC§ 3-203. See also §§ 1-201(20), 3-301, and comment to§ 3-
203. 
34. See Kelley, lJefensive Remedies Under the Un!form Probate Code, PROBATE NOTES 
(American College of Probate Counsel), Winter Issue 1974-1975, p. 3, reprinted in UPC NOTES 
No. 12, at 1 (June 1975). 
35. See Martin, Justice and Efficiency Under a Model of Estate Settlement, 66 VA. L. REV, 
727, 773-74 (1980). 
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dent probate and administration appropriately minimize the role of 
the court system in estate settlement. The state has no greater inter-
est in enforcing the substantive rules of inheritance than it has in 
enforcing the rules governing contracts, trusts and other private ar-
rangements controlling private wealth.36 All of these rules support 
socially desirable institutions and arrangements. But, the state's in-
terest in these matters of private law is limited to providing mecha-
nisms to resolve disputes and reasonably definite guidelines as to 
how a court would rule if asked to resolve a dispute. Individuals 
know that there are such rules and that their legal rights will be vin-
dicated if a dispute forces a matter to court. Once they are so as-
sured, the law properly fades into the background. People deal with 
other people on their own terms. They often avoid or resolve con-
flicts by utilizing their private resources, and recourse to court, with 
attendant costs to those involved and to the public, is avoided.37 
Second, most persons believe that succession to the wealth of a 
spouse, parent, or other close relative or friend should be a private 
matter, especially where the successors are willing and able to pay all 
claims against the estate.38 Testator-successor control of estates pro-
36. The state may have a special interest in aiding the discovery and effectuation of dece-
dents' intentions as expressed in wills. But this state interest does not justify conventional 
court supervision of estates. The most that a court can do under present laws to protect dece-
dents' intentions is to force wills to be publicly filed after death so that the testators' expres-
sions are established. Competent devisees or heirs may defeat decedents' intent by rearranging 
holdings of inherited assets in any way that pleases them, unless they have been effectively 
restrained by words of trust or future interest. 
37. See Thibaut & Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541 (1978). The au-
thors, using social psychology to probe various procedural systems in legal process, identify 
disputes concerning "truth" and "justice" as calling for different procedures for resolution. 
They suggest that an autocratic procedure is most useful to determine truth, but persons whose 
interests are in direct conflict do not value truth. Their inconsistent claims, such as inconsis-
tent claims to the division of estate assets, are best resolved with the aim of distributive justice. 
According to Thibaut and Walker,justice requires distribution of values in dispute in propor-
tion to the parties' respective input to the transaction underlying the dispute. Hence, the best 
procedure to resolve direct conflict is the one that "facilitates the fullest possible reports of 
inputs prior to determination of distribution." Extending the Thibaut and Walker analysis, 
Professor Martin found that the U.P.C. provides the best procedure to resolve probate dis-
putes. Martin, supra note 35, at 773-75. 
By contrast, Professor Alford found Virginia's commissioner of accounts system to serve 
especially well in deterring rancorous family arguments over inheritance. That system uses 
skilled specialists who are forced on persons interested in a Virginia probate estate. Alford, 
Some Ma/or Problems in Alternatives to Probate, 32 THE RECORD 53 (1977). Alford fails to 
demonstrate, however, why persons interested in an estate should not be free to choose a 
respected private attorney, a corporate executor, or some other person to function in lieu of a 
state official. In the circumstances of an estate, distributive justice would seem to be best 
served by the widest possible range of choices by survivors interested in guidance, decisions, 
and other services. 
38. Persons in close or confidential relationships very frequently rely on private under-
standings and personal integrity in financial arrangements with one another. Consider, for 
example, the enormous amount of litigation involving claims of constructive or resulting trusts 
and disputes over joint bank accounts. See 5 A. SCOTT, THE LA w OF TRUSTS 3324 (3d ed. 
510 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 79:501 
motes privacy. 
Finally, people commonly believe that the inheritance process 
should occur with a minimum of red tape, cost, and delay. Proce-
dures that permit families to agree about estate settlements should 
eliminate extended and expensive legal proceedings and reduce pro-
bate costs and delays. Also, these procedures transform the role of 
lawyers, court officials, bondsmen, and appraisers from one that is 
unnecessary and forced, to one that interested survivors identify. as 
helpful. The UPC encourages fee agreements between survivors and 
experts to whom they turn for assistance; fee competition should de-
velop. Make-work and excessive fees should be curtailed. In time, 
and depending largely on how well or badly the legal profession 
functions, nonlawyers may begin to play a useful role in advising 
survivors about how they should handle their out-of-court affairs. 
Though far from conclusive, two studies of the Uniform Probate 
Code in Idaho, the first state to enact it, verify that independent pro-
bate and independent administration reduce costs and delays.39 In 
addition, the UPC has reduced the work of probate court officials,40 
hence reducing the cost of probate administration to the public. 
B. Compromising UPC Standards for Testator-Successor Control 
of Estates 
In spite of the demonstrations that the UPC responds to con-
sumer demands, many believe that the best legislative strategy to 
achieve UPC procedural goals is to amend present codes rather than 
replace them with the new, national recommendation. The effective-
ness of the UPC in implementing the general concept of testator-
successor control of estates is the result of many specific elements 
acting together. Anyone considering amendments to existing codes 
1967), 0. BROWDER, R. CUNNINGHAM, J. JULIN & A. SMITH, BASIC PROPERTY LAW 750-81 
(3d ed. 1979). The American tendency to disregard legalities in intra-family wealth arrange-
ments may be due to ill-fitting legal forms, or to the dazzling complexity of the law of fifty-one 
different jurisdictions, each with its own property rules. In any event, there is no apparent 
reason to assume that family attitudes about the desirability of complying strictly with legal 
forms suddenly change when a family member dies and survivors confront the business of 
settling an estate. A serious source of consumer unrest with American probate law and proce• 
dure is that the rules often prevent families from handling succession in their own way. This is 
not to say that the law should not provide procedures to aid families from being torn asunder 
by arguments over estates. See Alford, supra note 37, at 53. 
39. See Crapo, The Un!form Probate Code-It Still Works in Idaho, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV, 
343; Kinsey, A Contrast of Trends in Administrative Costs in .Decedents' Estates In a Un!form 
Probate Code State (Idaho) and a Non-UnffeJrm Probate Code Stale (North .Dakota), 50 N.D. 
L. REV. 523 (1974). 
40. Schroeder, The Altered Role of the Court Under the UPC, UPC NoTEs No. 10, at I 
(Nov. 1974). 
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should try to incorporate all of these elements, which are listed in the 
following text as a series of fourteen principles. Experience suggests, 
however, that states are unlikely to adopt amendments that include 
all of these principles. Instead, they are likely to adopt compromis~s 
that loosen, but do not cut, the legal ties that presently bind estates to 
the court system. Part II of this Article therefore evaluates the utility 
of some of the compromises that may prove necessary. 
The UPC concept of testator-successor control of estates em-
braces the following principles: 
1. The apparent intestate successors to an estate should not be forced 
to take steps to settle the estate by the threat that a public official will 
gain control of the estate if they fail to act.41 Further, they should not 
be forced to settle the estate by the fear of undiscovered wills and un-
known creditors that act as clouds on unadministered estates; instead, 
such clouds should be eliminated by statutory time limitations for pro-
bating wills42 or for making claims against the estate.43 It does not 
follow that creditors of estates, including the state as the beneficiary of 
inheritance taxes, should be powerless to force administration. 
2. Nonadjudicative procedures to establish a filed, original will and 
to secure appointment of an estate controller should be available to 
eligible applicants quickly after the testator's death. Public officials 
should have minimal discretion to interfere. Further, the procedures 
should be unimpeded by delayed hearings44 or by advance notice to 
interested persons.45 They should also be free of unnecessary require-
ments, such as the production of the witnesses who attested to a will 
presented for probate.46 
3. Publicly recognized estate authority should be controlled first by 
the decedent, then the survivors.47 The probate court should only be 
able to appoint someone not having priority after notice to and default 
by those with priority, and then only when administration of the estate 
is necessary.48 
4. Testator-successor control of estates should not be restricted by im-
posed residency or co-fiduciary requirements on otherwise qualified 
persons.49 However, long-arm provisions should subject any person 
41. See UPC§ 3-108 and Comment;§ 3-203 and Comment. 
42. See UPC §§ 3-102, -108. The exceptions in the UPC to the probate requirement in § 3-
102 are narrowly drawn and involve substantial burdens of proof. 
43. See UPC § 3-803. 
44. See UPC art. III, pt. 3. 
4S. See UPC §§ 3-306, -3 IO. In the UPC's informal proceedings, notice to interested per-
sons is generally unnecessary. However, in appointment proceedings, persons having priority 
for appointment are entitled to notice, and, in probate or appointment proceedings, persons 
who have demanded notice as provided in § 3-204 are entitled to notice. See §§ 3-306, -310. 
46. UPC§ 3-303(c). 
41. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
48. UPC § 3-203(e). 
49. UPC§ 3-203(f), which contains the entire text of the code concerning qualifications for 
personal representatives, makes no mention of residency or co-fiduciary requirements. 
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accepting estate authority to the c~ntinuing jurisdiction of the court 
that issued the letters of authority.50 
5. No surety bond should be required of estate fiduciaries unless de-
manded by certain interested persons. 51 
6. The fiduciary's control of an estate should include broad adminis-
trative powers including the power to sell land without court order or 
approval. Also, purchasers and others dealing in good faith with an 
estate fiduciary should be explicitly protected against contentions that 
the fiduciary lacked authority to execute the transaction.52 
7. Estate fiduciaries should not be compelled to make estate inven-• 
tories and appraisals public, except to the extent that nonprobate suc-
cessors would be required to do so for tax purposes.53 
8. When necessary at all, estate appraisals should be made by whom-
ever estate fiduciaries select rather than by publicly designated apprais-
ers.54 
9. Reasonable procedures for identifying, satisfying, or barring estate 
creditors without the aid of the court system should be provided.55 
The court system should maintain a public file for claims and should 
remain a source of decision in disputed cases. 
10. Estate fiduciaries should be permitted to make distributions of 
estate assets at any time they deem satisfactory, subject to the fiduci-
ary's liability for erroneous distributions.56 Distributees should be able 
to transfer good title to good faith purchasers, even though the distrib-
utees are subject, for a limited period of time, to restitution of assets or 
values they receive erroneously. 57 
11. Estate fiduciaries should be protected from liability when they 
make distributions in good faith before notice of efforts to establish or 
contest a will that might change the testacy status of the estate.58 
12. The resolution of whether and when an estate fiduciary ceases to 
hold any legal authority over estate assets as against estate beneficiaries 
should be left to the controllers and their beneficiaries; no court filing 
marking the end of an administration should be required.59 
13. Estate fiduciaries should be afforded reasonable opportunities, 
through judicial order or limitations, to gain relief from unending risks 
of liability for their handling of estates.60 
50. See UPC § 3-602. 
5 I. UPC §§ 3-603, -605. 
52. See U.P.C. §§ 3-703, -711 to -715. The provisions apply equally to intestate and testate 
estates. 
53. See UPC§ 3-706. 
54. See UPC § 3-707. 
55. See UPC art. III, pt. 8. 
56. See UPC§§ 3-703, -715(27), -807, -1005. 
57. UPC§§ 3-909, -910, -1004. 
58. UPC§ 3-703(b). 
59. See UPC§§ 3-1001 to -1003. 
60. UPC§§ 3-1003, -1005. Also,§ 3-1001 describes an optional adjudicated closing proce-
dure that includes adjudication of 'will or no will' and a determination of heirs. Section 3-1002 
describes an optional adjudicated closing that may be useful to settle the meaning of a will 
where the interested parties have no interest in finally settling the question of will or no will. 
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14. As discussed above,61 the statute should not give public officials a 
role in the determination of undisputed fiduciary or attorney fees. Full 
testator-survivor control requires freedom to bargain for fiduciary or 
attorney assistance without interference by price-fixing statutes or 
court procedures. 62 
Obviously, some of these principles contribute less to the goal of 
full testator-survivor control of estates than others. For instance, 
UPC procedural objectives are not greatly compromised by the pos-
sibility that some state agency may gain control ( contrary to princi-
ple 163) if no one who is eligible for control takes any action within a 
reasonable period after the decedent's death. So long as survivors 
need only file applications with the local probate office to secure ap-
pointment of an unsupervised fiduciary of their own choosing, no 
great disruption results from laws that threaten them with loss of 
control if they do not act seasonably. 
Other principles could also be compromised. The UPC assumes 
survivor competence and assent to lack of court involvement unless 
an interested person commences a formal testacy or appointment 
proceeding ( or a supervised administration) by filing a petition with 
the probate court.64 Therefore, a system that makes UPC procedural 
advantages available only when all apparent successors are compe-
tent adults who file waivers with the probate office falls short of UPC 
standards. However, it is preferable to a system that forces court 
involvement upon successors who do not desire it. 
A requirement that an attesting witness testify before an uncon-
tested will may be probated (contrary to principle 265) is less damag-
ing than requirements in opening proceedings of advance notice, 
hearing and final adjudication. This is because problems caused by 
unknown or unavailable witnesses can be avoided by testators who 
use holographic wills or wills prepared by law offices that use care in 
selecting witnesses. 
A system that defers testator-successor control until a formal ju-
dicial proceeding confirms the probate of a will or produces a ruling 
of intestacy identifying the heirs ( contrary to principles 1 and 266) is 
preferable to one that subjects the management and distribution of 
an estate to mandatory court supervision or review (contrary to prin-
6 l. See text following note 38 supra. 
62. UPC§ 3-719. Section 3-721 allows interested persons to seek court review of fees and 
refund of excessive fees. 
63. See text at note 41 supra. 
64. See UPC §§ 3-401, -502. 
65. See text at note 46 supra. 
66. See text at notes 41 & 44 supra. 
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ciples 5-10, 1267). Survivors gain more from a forced adjudication 
establishing whether a will or intestate-succession statute controls an 
estate than from a forced adjudication at the conclusion of an ad-
ministration. The former proceeding identifies the successors and 
provides a sound basis for permitting them to assume responsibility 
for the details of their sharing. By contrast, a blanket requirement of 
court adjudications or filings at all closings, if rigorously enforced by 
the court system, imposes court supervision on every detail of an 
administration. Such a requirement accomplishes nothing that can-
not be accomplished more satisfactorily by beneficiary agreement, 
and can easily nullify other principles of testator-successor control, 
such as excusing the filing of bond or inventories or conferring broad 
administrative power on estate fiduciaries. 
Compromise of some of the other UPC principles for administer-
ing estates can also seriously threaten testator-successor control. For 
example, a minimum package must relieve distributees, after a time, 
of the risk that they may have to return distributed assets or 
equivalent values to meet an undiscovered claim of some kind (prin-
ciple 1068). If this feature is omitted, the threat of interminable per-
sonal liability will drive many successors to court for protective 
judicial orders. Also, estate fiduciaries and successors, acting with-
out court approval, must be able to sell titles that are as marketable 
as they were when held by the decedent (principles 6 and 1069), and 
titles under deeds of sales from a fiduciary or a distributee must be 
secure even though the sale may have been improper or the distribu-
tion may have been erroneous and subject to recall. Procedural re-
forms that fail to provide noncourt methods of clearing succession 
questions from land titles off er little of consequence to survivors of 
deceased landowners, since the presence of land in an estate is fre-
quently the only reason estates need to be administered.70 The UPC 
protects purchasers without relieving a fiduciary or distributees of 
liability to those injured by an improper sale or distribution. The 
relevant provisions apply to sales made after letters have been is: 
sued.71 Similar provisions that apply only to sales occurring after a 
delay period following the issuance of letters is an acceptable com-
promise, provided that the delay period is relatively short, such as 
67. See text at notes 51-57, 59 supra. 
68. See text at note 57 supra. 
69. See text at notes 52 & 57 supra. 
70. See Dunham, The Method, Process, and Frequency of Wealth Transmission al JJealh, 30 
U. CHI. L. REV. 241 (1963). 
71. See UPC§§ 3-714, -910; text at note 57 supra. 
January 1981] Probate Reform 515 
sixty or ninety days. However, an additional requirement that there 
be no objection filed during the delay period would force purchasers 
to check probate court records. Such a requirement is inconsistent 
with the UPC, which relieves purchasers of constructive notice of the 
content of probate court files in order to minimize title problems.72 
Some elements of administration can be compromised without so 
seriously undermining testator-successor control. A law that com-
pels estate inventories to be filed in public probate offices obviously 
contradicts both the seventh principle of testator-successor control of 
estates73 and efforts to keep details of family holdings private. Still, 
a filed inventory requirement may be a tolerable compromise if the 
filing has little effect on subsequent events, only involves appraisals· 
that are clearly necessary, and does not require the appraisers to be 
court appointed (principle 874). Similarly, since disputed claims are 
relatively infrequent, a rule that requires a court filing or court ap-
proval to bar a disputed claim ( contrary to principle 975) need not be 
seriously intrusive. This assumes that the fiduciary is permitted to 
pay an unfiled or unapproved claim (principle 9), and to sell or dis-
tribute a marketable title to estate assets despite the possibility of 
unbarred claims (principles 6 and 1176). 
Reformers may also be as~ed to compromise the UPC's proce-
dures for closings, including the UPC's omission of any required 
court filing to mark the end of an administration (principle 1277). 
The UPC permits the personal representative to make such a filing 
as a means of terminating his fiduciary responsibilities; his appoint-
ment terminates one year after the filing if no proceedings are pend-
ing in court.78 A compromise making this filing mandatory would 
introduce only a slight burden. However, a complete accounting of 
all receipts and disbursements obviously is more onerous. This is so 
even if an accounting that is not objected to by a party in interest 
becomes final without a hearing. Complete accounting for the pur-
poses of a public probate record violates beneficiaries' interests in 
privacy. If the accounting is complicated, it may serve principally to 
72. This purpose appears most clearly from UPC § 3-714, and Comment. Under the UPC, 
purchasers do bear the risk of the genuineness and current validity of letters upon which they 
rely. 
13. See text at note 53 supra. 
14. See text at note 54 supra. 
15. See text at note 55 supra. 
16. See text at notes 52 & 56 supra. 
11. See text at note 59 supra. 
78. UPC§ 3-1003. The UPC view is that unterminated authority in a personal representa-
tive is harmless and potentially useful in cases involving later discovered assets. 
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force the personal representative to obtain expensive technical assist-
ance. Also, court accounting requirements invite abuse by court per-
sonnel who have typically made compliance unnecessarily difficult 
for persons unfamiliar with local practice. Finally, accounting re-
quirements may lead beneficiaries to believe that the handling of an 
estate has been reviewed with care even though court personnel have 
merely checked the account of the fiduciary for superficial accuracy. 
Legislators should not support a bill that requires the probate 
fiduciary to file a detailed accounting in court unless it also provides 
a hearing - with prior notice to all interested parties - that con-
cludes with a binding order settling the estate. If fiduciaries arid suc-
cessors are to be harassed by an accounting requirement, the 
proceeding should be as useful as possible. The binding settlement 
would prevent later claims among successors based upon some error 
of will interpretation or distribution. Moreover, if law-trained 
judges review final and distributive accounts and interrogate the ac-
countants, beneficiaries may gain some useful protection, including 
protection against the tendency of less qualified court personnel to 
add unnecessarily to the accounting burden. 
Overall, a statutory system with an option for testator-successor 
control of estates should comply, as much as is politically possible, 
with all fourteen principles underlying the UPC. In general, the stat-
ute should off er persons who want to distribute and close an estate 
privately reasonable prospects of achieving their objectives. Ideally, 
it would provide opening procedures that meet UPC standards for 
nonadjudicated probate and appointment proceedings. In addition, 
the testator-successor group would have the power to sell or dis-
tribute marketable title without delay, and some assurance against 
endless liability to unknown claimants or successors. They would 
also be spared the need to report to courts and to obtain court orders 
approving accounts and distributions, and discharging the fiduciary 
- in other words, they would be free from official intermeddling 
aimed only at protecting the controllJng group from a fiduciary 
whom they or the testator had selected. Finally, the legislation 
would not control the amount of fiduciary and attorney fees; it 
would not set statutory percentage scales or authorize court person-
nel to review and approve uncontested fees. The combination of 
compromises of these principles that will satisfy political opponents 
while preserving the essence of testator-successor control must be 
identified pragmatically in each state. 
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II. FROM THEORY TO REALITY: A LOOK AT SEVEN LEGISLATIVE 
ATTEMPTS AT TESTATOR-SUCCESSOR CONTROL OF 
ESTATES VIA UNSUPERVISED FIDUCIARIES 
The seven non-UPC statutes selected here for detailed examina-
tion are not the only recent probate law amendments that have 
tended to deregulate probate estates.79 Further, the laws discussed 
here are not, as a group, the most successful non-UPC probate re-
form laws that have been enacted since promulgation of the UPC. 
The common denominator of the legislation analyzed here is that 
each offers a new, optional mode of settling estates as an alternative 
to some of the requirements of traditional, court-supervised probate 
administration. 80 
Unfortunately, the statutes also share a common failure: none 
achieves UPC standards. The new District of Columbia law, which 
is discussed in a separate subdivision of this Part, is a step backward 
that will increase probate costs for survivors. The enactments in In-
diana, Missouri and Kansas, respectively fourth, fifth, and sixth in 
quality among the six state laws discussed in the first subdivision of 
this Part, provide no relief for consumers. The new Michigan sys-
tem, which practically matches the UPC, is the best of the lot; it 
should greatly reduce the work in many estate settlements and 
should result in significant economies for survivors. The Illinois and 
Wisconsin statutes are useful, but less so than Michigan's. All offer 
some object lessons for legislative draftsmen and citizens who seek 
better inheritance procedures. 
A. Six Midwestern Laws 
Michigan. Michigan's revised probate code, enacted in 1978,81 
offers an optional, out-of-court alternative to supervised proceedings 
for the settlement of both intestate and testate estates known as "in-
dependent probate."82 The new procedure contains many of the ele-
ments of the UPC and provides many of the same advantages. For 
79. The state laws mentioned in the text at notes 7-16supra illustrate other recent changes. 
80. The judgment that the California and South Dakota statutes, see text at notes 9 & 16 
supra, should not be classified with the seven states discussed here may be arbitrary. Both 
involve options to pursue an independent administration procedure, and so can be compared 
with those selected for discussion. However, neither involves any relief from standard court 
accounting procedures or from adjudicated opening procedures. Hence, they seem closer to 
the Hawaiian system, supra note 11, which involves no options but provides broad statutory 
powers to all personal representatives who remain subject to full court accounting require-
ments. 
81. Revised Probate Code, ch. 642, 1978 MICH. PUB. ACTS 2542 (codified at MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN.§§ 700.1-.993 (West 1980)). 
82. Revised Probate Code, ch. 642, art. 3, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 700.301-.361 (West 
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example, it closely tracks the UPC's informal probate and appoint-
ment proceedings, 83 and eliminates the costs and delays of Michi-
gan's conventional, formal proceedings. 84 
The new system also follows the most important elements of the 
UPC for the administration of estates. 85 One difference between the 
two systems is the relationship between openings and administration. 
In Michigan, "informal probate" embraces openings and adminis-
1980). See generally J. FOSTER & E. ZACK, INDEPENDENT PROBATE ADMINISTRATION IN 
MICHIGAN (1980). 
83. Under Michigan's unsupervised probate procedures, as under the UPC, openings can 
be handled by a register rather than a judge. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 700.303, 
.306 (West 1980) with U.P.C. §§ 1-307, 3-30l(a) (UPC uses the name "Registrar" rather than 
"register"). Like the UPC's informal proceedings, Michigan's unsupervised procedures do not 
involve an adjudication. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 700.308(1), .309(5), .312 (West 
1980) with UPC §§ 3-303(c), -305, -307. However, during unsupervised procedures under ei-
ther the Michigan code or the UPC, if any interested persons object to the probate of a will or 
to the appointment of an independent personal representative, they can file a petition and 
obtain formal adjudication of their objection. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 700.318, 
.351 (West 1980) with UPC§§ 3-401, -402. Where probate is uncontested, neither the Michi-
gan nor the UPC procedures require testimony or affidavits from attesting witnesses to prove 
due execution of a will that contains a standard attestation clause and the required signatures. 
Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 700.308(1) (West 1980) with note 46 and accompanying 
text supra. Priority for appointment under the Michigan code is similar to priority under the 
UPC. Compare MICH. Co MP. LA ws ANN. § 700.311 (West 1980) with UPC § 3-203, discussed 
in text at notes 30, 47-48 supra. As under the UPC, see note 45 and accompanying text supra, 
the Michigan procedure permits the probate of a will and issuance ofletters of authority to the 
named executor without advance notice to heirs or devisees. The only requirement of advance 
notice applies where several persons share priority to be appointed personal representative. As 
in the UPC, if several persons share priority, as where an unmarried intestate is survived by 
several children, an applicant must give notice to the other heirs unless they have nominated 
him or declined nominations themselves. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.311(4) (West 
1980); UPC § 3-203(e). 
84. Persons who select supervised proceedings cannot gain control of an estate until the 
presentation of proofs or waivers of notice to interested persons and proof of due execution of 
a proffered will. Alternatively, they may seek appointment of a temporary administrator, but 
that entails an additional set of procedural requirements. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§§ 700.115, .172 (West 1980) describe procedures applicable to intestate estates; sections 
700.145 to .147, .172 control proceedings to probate a will and secure appointment of a per-
sonal representative. Proof of heirship may be required in either setting to satisfy the court 
that proper notice of the proceeding has been given. Cf. sections 700. 183, .184. 
85. The independent probate system excuses the personal representative from posting 
bond unless required by the will or demanded by an interested person. MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 700.313 (West 1980). Independent probate also excuses the personal representative 
from court filing of inventories, § 700.322, or accounts, §§ 700.301(3)(h)-(i) (making §§ 
700.563, .564, which require all probate fiduciaries to file periodic and final accounts, inappli-
cable to independent probate fiduciaries). These provisions are analogous to provisions of the 
UPC. See, respectively, notes 51 & 53, and text at notes 73-74 and following note 76 supra. In 
addition, personal representatives in the Michigan system, like those governed by the UPC, 
may proceed with estate settlement and distribution without court orders, see § 700.341, and 
are given broad and explicit fiduciary powers to do so. Sections 700.331, .332, .334. For analo-
gous UPC provisions, see notes 52, 55, 56 & 59 and accompanying text supra. Like the UPC, 
the Michigan procedures also include protection for fiduciaries acting in good faith, § 700.343, 
and for persons dealing with fiduciaries,§ 700.349, or with their distributees. Section 700.216. 
It also imposes a statute of limitations to end any dangling questions among distributees. Sec-
tion 700.358. For analogous provisions of the UPC, see notes 52, 57 & 58 supra and accompa-
nying text. 
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trations; informal administration is not available for estates opened 
by a conventional proceeding.86 By contrast, under the UPC, infor-
mal openings and informal administration are independently avail-
able; whether or not an estate was opened informally, the personal 
representative administers the estate informally unless supervised 
administration is ordered at the petition of an interested party. 87 In 
many cases, however, this difference between the Michigan code and 
the UPC will not be important. Since informal opening procedures 
and unsupervised administration generally promote the same pur-
poses, many persons in Michigan would have chosen both anyway. 
Unification of the two will result in the advantages of each promot-
ing the use of the other. Furthermore, there is no good reason not to 
use the new informal proceedings where no contest among succes-
sors or creditors is anticipated at the outset. Interested persons in-
volved in an estate that is being handled in "independent probate" 
can still readily tum to the probate court for rulings concerning the 
validity of any will or any other aspect of an estate settlement. 88 Ac-
cordingly, it seems inevitable that independent probate will be 
widely used and the traditional supervised proceedings in uncon-
tested cases will become rare. 
There may be a catch or two, however. "Independent probate" is 
described by only one of the six articles in the Michigan probate 
code that govern intestate and testate succession. The five other arti-
cles remain fully and intricately bound to the theory of court super-
vision of fiduciaries. 89 It is not easy to insert independent procedures 
into a probate code in which supervised proceedings continue to pro-
vide the organizing rationale.90 The result in Michigan has been 
some statutory gaps and inconsistencies that could cause difficulty. 
For example, creditors' claims are barred by different formulae de-
pending on whether independent or supervised proceedings are em-
86. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 700.301 to .306 (West 1980) (Revised Probate Code art. 3, 
Independent Probate). · 
87. See UPC§§ 3-107, -307(b), -501 to -505, -602. 
88. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 700.351 (West 1980). 
89. The five articles are: Article l, General Provisions; Article 2, Administration and Pro-
bate of Decedents' Estates; Article 5, Fiduciaries; Article 6, Management of Property or Assets 
of Estate; and Article 7, Claims Against Estates. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 700.1 to .35, 
.101 to .291, .501 to .598, .601 to .688, .701 to .767 (West 1980). 
90. In addition to the thirty-nine new sections added by the new Michigan article on in-
dependent probate, many changes or additions in other sections of the revised code were nec-
essary to accommodate the new procedure. A recent memorandum prepared for the Joint 
Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate Code and interested persons in Iowa contains prelim-
inary suggestions regarding language that should be added to the Iowa Probate Code if an 
independent administration option were added there. The recommendation describes thirty-
nine complete new sections and about fifty other changes and additions. 
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ployed. Creditors who are barred in independent probate may be 
able to revive their claims by moving the estate into supervised sta-
tus.9I Also, the Code lacks a provision clearly applicable to in-
dependent probate that limits the time within which estates may be 
opened and wills may be admitted to probate or contested.92 In ad-
dition, a section that is designed to prevent tardy reshuffling of assets 
distributed through an independent probate proceeding is garbled.93 
However, other sections appear to protect purchasers in sal~s 
91. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 700.701, .732 (West 1980) (controlling the bar-
ring of claims in a supervised administration) with § 700.328(2) (controlling claims against 
estates in independent probate). Section 700.328(2)(b), containing an exception to the bar of 
claims that have not been presented within a four-month period, refers to "final settlement and 
distribution of the assets of the estate." This might be held to refer to the filing of the closing 
statement described in§ 700.357, or to the end of limitations periods described in§ 700.358. 
Neither point in time is the same as the deadline for claims in supervised administrations. 
92. See J. FOSTER & E. ZACK, supra note 82, at§ 15.05. 
93. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 700.358(3) (West 1980) provides: 
Unless previously determined in a supervised proceeding settling the accounts of an 
independent personal representative or otherwise barred, the claim of a claimant to re-
cover from a distributee who is liable to pay the claim, and the right of an heir or devisee, 
or of a successor personal representative acting in their behalf, to recover property im-
properly distributed or the value of the property from any distributee is forever barred at 
the later of 3 years after the decedent's death or I year after the time of distribution. 
When fraud is perpetrated in connection with any probate court proceeding or filing relat-
ing to a decedent's estate is induced by fraud to refrain from initiating or participating in 
a probate court proceeding or from disclosing facts of relevance to a succession, a person 
who is deprived of an opportunity to establish his interest in a succession, may recover 
damages or obtain any other appropriate relief in an action against the perpetrator of the 
fraud or may obtain restitution from any person other than a bona fide J;>Urchaser benefit-
ing from the fraud whether innocent or not, by an action commenced within 2 years from 
the discovery of the fraud but an action may not be brought against any innocent party 
later than 5 years from the time of commission of the fraud or the death of the decedent 
whose estate is in question, whichever occurs later. 
The language in the second sentence following "relating to a decedent's estate" does not make 
sense. A phrase, such as "or a person," should be inserted as a subject of the language "is 
induced by fraud" and following. However, even if so read, the provision is unciear. Has 
property been "improperly distributed" if the distribution was proper under the assumption 
regarding testacy then prevailing, and that assumption is subsequently changed by proof of a 
later-executed will, or proof that a will previously assumed to be genuine is a forgery? The 
answer must be no if estates are to be able to be finally settled through independent probate, 
since the Michigan code omits any time limit on will contests or on probate of late-discovered 
wills, other than time limits on appeals from formal adjudications of will or no will. See note 
92 and accompanying text supra. Also, the language was borrowed from UPC§ 3-1006, where 
it is employed to bar claims arising from a distribution that is improper for any reason, includ-
ing a later change of assumption regarding testacy. For example, a late-discovered will may be 
probated at any time within three years of death where there has been no prior adjudication of 
testacy. If a will is probated before the three-year limitation has run, the devisees under the 
late-probated will have superior rights under§ 3-101 to assets previously distributed. These 
rights must be barred by§ 3-1006 at the later of three years from death or one year from the 
date of distribution if the widely recognized purpose of the Code to permit estates to be settled 
without adjudication is to be accomplished. Both the UPC and the Michigan code contain 
provisions that "authorize" a personal representative to rely upon the testacy status as of the 
time of a distribution, even though that status has not been established by binding adjudica-
tion. See UPC§ 3-703(b); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 700.343(1) & (2) (West 1980). Hence, 
both codes should be construed to mean that a distribution that is "authorized"' by one section 
is nonetheless "improper" for purposes of another section. 
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made by independent personal representatives or by distributees.94 
Hence, even if courts hold that estates settled without adjudication 
remain subject for indefinite periods to changes in testacy status, 
marketability of estate assets should not be adversely affected, and 
the independent procedure will off er practical advantages in most 
cases. 
These technical defects are likely to cause only minor problems 
because independent probate is so strongly supported by leading 
Michigan probate practitioners. Michigan lawyers have become 
convinced that the long-range interests of practitioners are best 
served by a probate system as free of unnecessary red-tape, delay 
and cost as possible.95 The new Michigan approach is the result of 
thirteen tempestuous years of discussion that placed most of Michi-
gan's probate judiciary in head-on conflict with practicing attor-
neys.96 It appears that the struggle was worth the effort. 
Illinois. Illinois amended its probate code in 1979.97 As in Mich-
igan, the new enactment added independent procedures to a com-
plex, traditional probate code that had required court supervision of 
executors and administrators in all cases.98 Like the Michigan stat-
ute, the Illinois enactment accomplished the UPC goals of permit-
ting unadjudicated openings and independent administration. 
The new Illinois procedure,. however, is considerably simpler 
than the Michigan procedure. The Illinois draftsmen did not insert 
both independent probate and independent administration as an al-
ternative to standard, court-supervised procedures, as did their coun-
terparts in Michigan. Instead, they added independent 
administration as an alternative to standard administration, while 
amending the standard opening procedures for all estates.99 The 
new opening procedures lower proof requirements and permit pro-
bate of wills and appointment of estate fiduciaries to occur quickly 
94. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 700.216, .349 (West 1980). 
95. See 59 MICH. ST. B.J., 528 (Aug. 1980); Michigan Lawyers Promote Use of Independent 
Administration, UPC NOTES No. 24, at 10-12 (Oct. 1979). 
96. See UPC NOTES No. 21, at 5 (Dec. 1977); UPC NOTES No. 18, at 2 (Dec. 1976); UPC 
NOTES No. 13, at 6 (Sept. 1975); UPC NoTES No. 5, at 8 (June 1973); UPC NOTES No. 3, at 7 
(Dec. 1972). 
97. Act of Aug. 22, 1979, Pub. Act 81-213, 1979 Ill. Laws 1142. The Illinois enactment 
became effective on January 1, 1980. It is described in Illinois Enacts Independent Administra• 
lion Procedure, UPC NOTES No. 24, at 13 (Oct. 1979). 
98. The principles of the Illinois Probate Act were directly opposed to those of the UPC. 
In addition to court supervision, the executor or administrator was required to make a formal 
accounting and was not discharged until final orders were issued by the court. 
99. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110½, §§ 6-2, 6-10 and related sections (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). 
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and before a final adjudication. Notice to heirs, devisees and credi-
tors now comes after probate rather than before; 100 once notified, 
interested persons have the opportunity to insist on more stringent 
proof of due execution and to contest the admission or denial of ad-
mission of the will to probate. By thus permitting unadjudicated 
openings for all estates, the new opening procedures are consistent 
with the policies of the UPC that underlie both informal openings 
and independent administration. By simplifying standard opening. 
procedures for all estates rather than creating an entirely new proce-
dure of openings and administration, Illinois avoided the gaps and 
inconsistencies that exist in the new Michigan code. 
The statutory powers given to independent personal representa-
tives and the protection afforded persons purchasing from indepen-
dent representatives and their distributees approximate UPC 
standards. 101 But other provisions were compromised by the Illinois 
legislature. For example, a late amendment limited appointment of 
an independent fiduciary to estates having a gross value of not more 
than $150,000. 102 The limitation invites court personnel hostile to 
independent administration to insist on strict proof of assets and val-
ues in assessing compliance with the ceiling. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, strict proof requirements could lead many survivor 
groups to conclude that the costs of establishing the conditions for 
independent administration exceed all the advantages of the proce-
dure. 
This ability of court personnel to sabotage the legislation may be 
offset by the narrow limits imposed on court discretion. The Illinois 
statute directs the court to grant independent administration unless 
the value ceiling is exceeded or unless a minor or disabled person is 
interested in the estate. 103 In contrast, the UPC, Michigan, Indiana, 
and Wisconsin procedures all give the court official who must ap-
prove the commencement of independent administration authority 
to decline a petition. 104 
If court personnel do not try to sabotage the legislation and rely 
instead on the petitioners' estimates of estate values for purposes of 
policing the $150,000 ceiling, the Illinois threshold requirements are 
less onerous for estates of modest size than comparable features of 
100. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. llO½ § 6-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). 
101. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110½, §§ 6-21, 8-1, § 8-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). 
102. ILL. ANN. STA. ch. 110½, § 28-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). 
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110½, § 28-2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). 
104. See UPC§ 3-309; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 700.309(2); IND. CODE§ 29-l-7.5-2(a) 
(Cum. Supp. 1979); Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 865.08(3) (West Supp. 1980). 
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the Wisconsin and Indiana statutes. For example, the Illinois proce-
dure, like the UPC, contains an implicit presumption that interested 
persons assent to independent administration until they dissent, and 
includes effective mechanisms for objection. 105 By contrast, the new 
Wisconsin and Indiana procedures require signed and filed consents 
of all interested persons as a precondition to independent adminis-
tration.106 
Draftsmen of the Illinois amendments were also frustrated by 
representatives of corporate sureties who persuaded the legislature to 
drop provisions from the bill that would have eliminated bond re-
quirements for independent fiduciaries. 107 The existing Illinois Pro-
bate Code had generally enforced provisions of wills that excused 
bonds, and lawyer-drawn wills routinely excused bond provisions. 
Probate court personnel who believed that a bond nonetheless 
should be required were forced to resort to tightly drawn exceptions 
to the Code. However, nothing in the new independent administra-
tion can relieve successors to an intestate decedent of the expense of 
a probate bond. The Michigan statute stands ahead of its Illinois, 
Wisconsin, and Indiana counterparts on this point.108 
The Illinois legislature also compromised the originally proposed 
closing procedures for estates in independent administration.109 The 
bar associations that sponsored the original proposal had followed 
the UPC and recommended that filing of closing statements be op-
105. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110½, §§ 28-2, 28-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). 
106. See Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 865.02 (West Supp. 1980) (consent of all interested persons is 
required unless the will names a personal representative who accepts appointment and fur-
nishes bond); IND. CODE§ 29-l-7.5-2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
107. Recommendations of the joint committee of the Chicago Bar Association and Illinois 
State Bar Association, as well as a draft oflegislation proposed to effectuate the recommenda-
tions, were circulated in a report of the joint committee dated June 25, 1976 [hereinafter cited 
as Joint Committee Report]. A copy of this report, and of the bill as it appeared in a draft of 
October 14, 1976, are on file with the Michigan Law Review. The joint committee recom-
mended that: 
No bond would be required of the independent representative, even in an intestate 
estate. However, any interested person could require the usual bond at any time by secur-
ing a termination of independent administration. 
108. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.313 with ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110½, §§ 28-1 
to 28-12, Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 865.07(l)(f) (West Supp. 1980), and IND. CODE§ 29-1-7.5-1 to 29-
1-7.5-8 (1976 & Supp. 1979). 
109. The recommendation of the joint committee of the Chicago Bar Association and Illi-
nois State Bar Association regarding closing papers had been as follows: 
When the estate was fully administered, the representative would be accountable to all 
interested persons for his administration and distribution of the estate, but he would not 
be required to present an account to the court. If the independent representative wanted a 
court order of discharge he would be entitled to one upon filing applicable receipts and 
approvals from the interested persons, but would not be required to file a detailed ac-
counting of his receipts and disbursements in the court. 
Joint Committee Report, supra note 107, at 4-5. 
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tional. The legislation added notice and accounting requirements to 
closing statements and made filing of closing statements 
mandatory. 110 Since closing procedure for independent fiduciaries 
involves paperwork and special requirements, many fiduciaries may 
exercise an option to close independent administrations by conven-
tional procedures involving an accounting to the court and distribu-
tive order. 111 
Still, Illinois independent administration plainly offers significant 
opportunities to trim red tape. It eliminates requirements for orders 
of sale, orders fixing family allowances, orders approving com-
promises of claims, and other court orders or filings that previously 
applied to administration of all intestate estates and some estates 
governed by wills. In addition, the new procedure permits facts and 
figures regarding estate settlements to be kept off the public record, 
an advantage for many successors. Independent administration also 
frees successors and their assistants from inquiries and nitpicking re-
quirements that court personnel can erect when court accountings 
are unavoidable. Thus, the statute should enable fiduciaries and at-
torneys to discharge their responsibilities more efficiently; whether 
fee reductions in fact result remains to be seen. 112 
I 10. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 10½, § 28-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980). The legislation added a 
requirement that statements from distributees be attached to the closing statement showing 
that each received copies of an estate inventory and an accounting by the fiduciary. It also 
requires the fiduciary to state whether fees paid or payable to the fiduciary and to the attorney 
have been approved by all interested persons. Section 28-11(7), (8). 
If the filed closing statement is accompanied by statements from all creditors and interested 
persons showing either that they have received all sums due from the fiduciary, or that they 
fully approve of the closing statement, the court must discharge the fiduciary immediately. In 
other cases, the court must notify interested persons who have not waived their right that they 
have ninety days to file objections to the closing statement. If no objections are filed, the 
fiduciary is discharged after the waiting period. If an objection is pending at the end of the 
period, the court must notify all interested persons and may order the fiduciary to submit a 
verified account of his administration to the court. Section 28-11. 
111. Independent fiduciaries are especially likely to choose conventional closing proce-
dures if the successors are numerous and widely scattered. The requirement of the special 
procedures that independent fiduciaries attach statements from distributees to the closing 
statement, for example, causes the burden of the special closing procedures to become espe-
cially onerous as the number of successors grows. See note 110 supra. Infrequent use of the 
special procedures will also result if the unavoidable bondsmen insist upon adjudicated clos-
ings and discharge orders. 
112. One final technical note: Illinois stands alone in accepting a theory of unsupervised 
administration and distribution without providing a limitations section to settle distributions 
made without adjudication. The omission is not surprising, for Illinois probate law has never 
included a statutory time limit on proceedings to probate wills and administer estates, and the 
probate of a late-discovered will is not considered to be a contest of a previously probated will 
even though the later will revokes the earlier one. It is unfortunate, however, that the Illinois 
lawyers who prepared the recent legislation did not see fit to arrange independent administra-
tion so that distributions from an independent fiduciary would become more secure than dis-
tributions ordered in a supervised proceeding. 
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Wisconsin. Wisconsin's "informal administration" procedure 
was enacted in 1973 113 in response to a citizens' petition signed by 
more than 300,000 voters demanding probate reform. 114 The proce-
dure is designed to be invoked either as a part of a proceeding to 
secure both probate of a will and an appointment of a fiduciary or 
after an estate has been opened by conventional procedures.115 
When used in the first setting, the procedure follows standard estate 
opening procedures of the adjudicative variety. 116 
In either setting, threshold requirements are inconsistent with the 
UPC. Estates of all sizes may use independent probate, but all inter-
ested persons must consent to the proceeding and to the person who 
will serve as fiduciary unless priority to administer is held by a 
named executor who elects the unsupervised procedure. 117 Advance 
notice to all interested persons, a feature of Wisconsin's standard ad-
judicated opening, is required, but may be waived; a published no-
tice to creditors is also required. 118 
Persons eligible to serve as fiduciaries under the new procedure 
must exhibit the same qualifications that apply in standard proceed-
ings. If there is no named and qualified executor, only a qualified 
person who is chosen by all heirs or all will beneficiaries may serve. 
Contrary to the principles of the UPC, 119 the standard qualifications 
discourage use of nonresidents who may be preferred by the succes-
sors. This discrimination seems unnecessary since the new proce-
dure includes a long-arm statute that subjects anyone accepting 
letters to the continuing personal jurisdiction of the court.120 
Some elements of independent administration and closings are 
113. Act of June 22, 1973, ch. 39, § 9, 1973 Wis. Laws 102 (codified at WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 865.01-.19 (West Supp. 1980)). 
114. Comment, Informal Administration of .Decedents' Estates in Wisconsin, 1974 Wis. L. 
REV. 581, 581; On, Wisconsin: UPC's "Flexible System" Is Near, UPC NOTES No. 5, at 1 (June 
1973). 
115. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 865.04 (West Supp. 1980). 
116. Consistent with the UPC, see text at note 46 supra, both the standard and informal 
procedures permit probate of a will on the strength of an attestation clause reciting that the 
elements of due execution have occurred; it is unnecessary to produce an attesting witness in 
person or by affidavit. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 856.15 (West Supp. 1980). Under the informal 
procedure, the moving document is an "application" to the "probate registrar," rather than a 
"petition" to the court. See §§ 865.03, .04. 
117. Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 865.02 (West Supp. 1980). Under the UPC, unanimous consent to 
independent procedures is not required, and the decedent's spouse can act as independent 
fiduciary without unanimous consent in the absence of a named executor. See text at notes 44-
48 supra. 
118. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 865.05(1) (West Supp. 1980). The UPC requires notice only to 
interested persons who have demanded it. U.P.C. §§ 3-306, -310. See text at note 45 supra. 
119. See text at note 49 supra. 
120. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 865.07, -.08 (West Supp. 1980). 
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consistent with the UPC, but several are not. On one hand, contrary 
to the UPC, 121 the registrar has discretionary power to require bond 
even where a will excuses bond.122 Inventories must be prepared 
and copies furnished to all interested persons, although court filing 
of the inventory is optional.123 On the other hand, procedures for 
ascertaining and eliminating creditors claims are the same as in court 
supervised administrations124 and appear to meet UPC standards. 
Fiduciaries governed by the new law enjoy full administrative pow-
ers like those available to supervised probate fiduciaries in Wiscon-
sin. Purchaser protection for persons dealing with the estate 
fiduciary or with distributees of the estate is also provided and may 
be, but should not be, construed to apply only to fiduciaries ap-
pointed under the new procedure.125 Contrary to the UPC, closing is 
by a sworn filed document. However, the document need state only 
that various statutory requirements have been met; details are not 
required. Also unlike the UPC, the registrar is empowered to deter-
mine whether attorneys' fees charged are just and reasonable and to 
refer excessive fee problems to the court for resolution. 126 Liabilities 
left dangling by the absence of an adjudicated closing are barred by 
limitations that follow UPC standards. 127 
The 1973 Wisconsin legislation was heavily publicized as permit-
ting "do-it-yourself' probate of estates. Apprehensions about this 
121. Both the UPC and Wisconsin enable a registrar to decline an application for any or 
no reason. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 865.08(3) (West Supp. 1980); U.P.C. §§ 3-305, -309. 
122. Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 865.07(1)(f) (West Supp. 1980). This provision is inconsistent with 
UPC principle 5 at note 51 supra. 
123. Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 865.11 (West Supp. 1980). This principle is inconsistent with UPC 
principle 7 at note 53 supra. 
124. As originally enacted, the relevant section of the Wisconsin Probate Code, Act of June 
22, 1973, ch. 39, sec. 9, § 865.135, 1973 Wis. Laws 102 (repealed 1976), described a slightly 
different mode of presenting claims in an informal administration. The section was repealed 
in 1976, Act of June 10, 1976, ch. 331, § 36, 1976 Wis. Laws 955, and§ 865.01 was amended to 
redescribe informal administration as court proceedings, presumably to clarify that standard 
claipis-presentment statutes governed claims in independent administration. Act of June 10, 
1976, ch. 331, § 26, 1975 Wis. Laws 955 (1976) (codified at W1s. STAT. § 865.01 (1977)). 
125. The Wisconsin Probate Code, Wis. STAT. ANN.§§ 857.01-.03 (West Supp. 1980), con-
fers title to estate assets on Wisconsin personal representatives and directs them to manage 
estates; § 860.01 expressly confers the power ''to sell, mortgage or lease any property in the 
estate without notice, hearing or court order" on personal representatives and relieves purchas-
ers of a duty to inquire regarding the propriety of a personal representative's exercise of the 
power. Section 865.09 gives an independent personal representative all powers of a personal 
representative holding letters issued by the court. A special statute protecting purchasers from 
distributees of a personal representative, which is necessary in independent administration 
because of the absence of any court order settling questions regarding the validity of his distri-
bution, is included in the chapter describing independent probate. See Wis. STAT. ANN, 
§ 865.15 (West Supp. 1980). 
126. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 865.16 (West Supp. 1980). 
127. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 865.17, .19 (West Supp. 1980). 
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development on the part of probate court personnel probably in-
spired a provision in the legislation as first enacted ordering that 
The probate registrar, the deputy, or members of the staff of the pro-
bate registrar, or other persons designated to perform the duties of the 
probate registrar, under this chapter, shall not be obligated to prepare, 
assist or advise in the preparation of any of the documents required to 
be prepared and filed by the personal representative under this chap-
ter.12s 
In 1978, the word "not" was deleted, and the words "within their 
competence" were inserted in its place, completely reversing the 
thrust of the statement. 129 
Wisconsin's opening ceremony, featuring a requirement of ad-
vance notice to interested persons and other trappings of an adjudi-
catory procedure, is an unnecessary complication by UPC standards. 
The discretionary powers of the registrar to decline applications, to 
compel independent fiduciaries to post bond, and to review attor-
neys' fees that have not been protested are understandable vestiges 
of the notion that probate courts guard estates. But they are unfortu-
nate and unnecessary contradictions of the principle of testator-suc-
cessor control of estates. The closing statement requirement is 
unnecessary but not very burdensome. 
In other respects, the Wisconsin version of independent adminis-
tration appears to meet UPC standards130 and to offer a clear and 
practical procedure for administering and distributing estates, once 
opened, with minimum court contact. The flaws mentioned lend the 
procedure to abuse by courts or registrars interested in enforcing the 
law for its own sake or for their own importance. Since the in-
dependent administration procedure offers no relief from overly for-
mal opening procedures for probate of wills and appointment of 
fiduciaries, and gives wide discretion to the Registrar, it is not sur-
prising that the new procedure is rarely used in some areas of the 
state, or that it accounted for only seventeen percent of all Wisconsin 
128. Act of June 22, 1973, ch. 39, sec. 9, § 865.065, 1973 Wis. Laws 102 (repealed 1978) 
(emphasis added). 
129. Act of May 16, 1978, ch. 343, sec. l, § 865.065(2), 1977 Wis. Laws 1350 (1978) (codi-
fied at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 865.065(2) (West Supp. 1980)). 
130. Procedures for ascertaining and eliminating creditors' claims are the same as in court 
supervised administrations, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 865.01 (West Supp. 1980), and appear to meet 
UPC standards. Independent fiduciaries have full administrative powers. Purchaser protec-
tion for persons dealing with the estate fiduciary or with distributees of the estate is also pro-
vided; these may, but should not, be construed to apply only to fiduciaries emerging from the 
new procedure. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 857.01, 857.03, 860.01, 865.09, 865.15 (West 
Supp. 1980) with U.P.C. §§ 3-714, 3-910. Liabilities left dangling by the absence of an adjudi-
cated closing are barred by limitations that follow UPC standards. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 865.17-.19 (West Supp. 1980) with UPC§§ 3-1005, 3-1006. 
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estates in 1978. Nor is it surprising that it usually involves a law-
yer.131 
Still, the new procedure appears to have lowered legal costs, and 
it is being used enough to become a fixture of Wisconsin law that 
may be expanded upon in the future. 132 Perhaps it will be used more 
frequently now that the registrars have been directed to give more 
assistance to persons in preparing forms required for informal proce-
dures.133 
Indiana. Indiana's version of independent administration, enti-
tled Unsupervised Administration, is contained in a short 1975 addi-
tion to the Indiana statutes. 134 Its drafting is attributable to lawyers 
who dominated the State's Probate Code Study Commission, which 
began serious study of the Uniform Probate Code only after being 
directed by the legislature to do so. 135 
The unsupervised administration procedure is integrated with In-
diana's standard opening procedure, but threshold requirements are 
added for unsupervised administration. The standard opening pro-
cedure discourages advance notice of an opening petition, because it 
requires that a jurisdictional notice of the proceeding be given after 
letters have been issued.136 When unsupervised administration is 
sought, however, as it may be at the time of or subsequent to filing of 
an initial estate proceeding, the clerk must publish a special notice of 
the petition for the benefit of creditors. 137 Other special threshold 
requirements are potentially quite formidable, presumably reflecting 
either extreme reluctance to alter Indiana's existing probate proce-
dures in any substantial way, or hostility to the concept of indepen-
dent administration, or both. Before granting a petition for 
unsupervised administration, the court must find that "the estate is 
131. See McCarty, Informal Administration in Wisconsin, 5 PROBATE NOTES No. 3, at 1 
(Spring 1979). 
132. Id. 
133. See text at notes 128-29 supra. 
134. Probate Reform Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 125, 1975 Ind. Acts 606 (current version at 
IND. CODE §§ 29-1-7.5-1 to -8 (1976 & Supp. 1979)). See Poland, Trusts and .Decedents' Es-
tates, SurPey of Recent .DePelopments in Indiana Law, 9 IND. L. REV. 371, 383-88 (1975). 
135. See Poland, supra note 134, at 377. 
136. See IND. CODE§§ 29-1-7-4, -7 (1976). The standard opening procedure is a variant of 
the Model Probate Code. See Model Probate Code § 68, contained within L. SIMES, 
PROBLEMS IN PROBATE LAW (1946). 
131. See IND. CODE§ 29-1-7,-7.5-l(b) (1976). This special notice may not have to occur 
prior to the granting of the petition. However, if the statute is interpreted differently, un-
supervised administration would involve a delay for published notice that does not relate to 
supervised administration proceedings, a burden that is more than the added expense of an 
extra published notice. 
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solvent; the personal representative is qualified to administer the es-
tate without court supervision; the heirs, or legatees and devisees, 
... freely consent to and understand the significance of administra-
tion without court supervision; and the will does not request super-
vised administration." 138 
Once the initial barriers have been surmounted, the balance of 
the Indiana procedure appears to be free of court control; un-
supervised fiduciaries have broad statutory powers, but there are 
some catches. First, either on its own motion or that of any inter-
ested person, the court may revoke an order of unsupervised admin-
istration and make any order regarding future estate activities that it 
pleases.139 Secondly, a new statutory power to sell land 140 is unsup-
ported by purchaser protection provisions that might serve to relieve 
purchasers of concerns regarding the propriety of the fiduciaries' ex-
ercise of the power. Hence, it is of little importance. 
Also, survivors to whom land is distributed in an unsupervised 
administration face title problems. Under supervised administra-
tion, the title of purchasers or distributees to such property is made 
marketable either by specific time limitations or final court orders 
that preclude any future claims that may arise for the property.141 
For example, a court order of final distribution bars probate of a will 
and therefore eliminates the possibility of late-probated wills that 
would otherwise be a cloud on the title of distributees. Under un-
supervised administration, however, there is no final order of distri-
bution. Instead, the possibilities of late-discovered wills and 
erroneous identification of heirs or devisees remain as title clouds 
until barred by time limitations in the new law;142 challenges to a 
138. IND. CODE§ 29-l-7.5-2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979); see generally Jurgemeyer, Indiana Pro-
bate Reform, UPC NOTES No. 16, at 3 (July 1976). 
139. See IND. CODE§ 29-l-7.5-2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979) .. Another possible catch is the re-
quirement of posting bond. The sections dealing with unsupervised administration are silent 
about whether bond may be required of an unsupervised personal representative. 
140. IND. CODE§ 29-1-7.5-3(6) (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
141. Under formal, supervised administration, wills are not contestable unless challenged 
within five months of being presented for probate. IND. CODE § 29-1-7-17 (1976). Intestate 
succession is final if no will is offered for probate before the final decree of distribution is 
entered, and purchasers from heirs are protected from late-probated wills if they purchase in 
good faith after five months from death and before a will has been duly probated. Section 29-
1-7-15.1. Creditors' claims and a spouse's elective rights are eliminated by time limits. See 
§§ 29-1-14-1 (5 months after first publication for creditors' claims), and 29-1-3-2 (10 days after 
expiration of nonclaim period for spouse's election). Time limits on the probate of wills, will 
contests, spouse's election, and creditors' claims apply to unsupervised estates as well as to 
supervised ones. 
142. IND. CODE§ 29-1-7-15 (1976) bars probate ofa will only after "the court decrees final 
distribution of the estate," an event that never occurs if final settlement and closing take place 
through unsupervised administration. 
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distribution are barred only at the later of three years from death or 
one year from the closing of an unsupervised administration.143 Dis-
tributees frequently will be unwilling to wait until the third anniver-
sary of death to market estate assets. Accordingly, title 
considerations will compel independent fiduciaries to forgo un-
supervised administrations and seek court orders of final distribu-
tion. 
Perhaps the unsupervised administration procedure offers some 
advantage to successors of estates consisting largely of cash or read-
ily marketable securities. In these cases, title questions that affect 
purchasers are settled as a practical matter once registration has been 
transferred from the decedent's name to the name of a purchaser or 
successor. In intestate cases, the unsupervised representative's statu-
tory powers144 and letters of administration should suffice to permit 
sales, if necessary, and to facilitate final distribution without court 
order. For testate estates, the procedure supplies administrative 
powers that may not be provided for in the will as well as an escape 
from inventory and accounting requirements.145 These advantages 
encourage the cooperative action necessary to invoke the proce-
dure.146 
Still, the procedure is not likely to be heavily used so long as 
court personnel have virtually unlimited discretion to give or with-
draw the authority contemplated by the statute. The procedure 
should be strengthened by addition of explicit purchaser protection 
provisions, by significant reduction of the threshold requirements, 
and by limitation of the discretionary authority of the probate court 
to terminate unsupervised administration. 
Missouri. The 1980 enactment of a system of independent ad-
ministration in the Missouri code147 seems surprising in view of a 
previously existing provision in the state's probate code that deals 
with compensation for personal representatives and their attor-
neys.148 For personal representatives, the provision fixes minimum 
143. IND. CODE§ 29-1-7.5-7 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
144. See IND. CODE §§ 29-1-7.5-3(19), (23) (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
145. See IND. CODE§§ 29-1-7.5-3, -4 (Cum. Supp. 1979). 
146. However, since the court that issues letters to an unsupervised personal representative 
can invoke standard procedures on its own motion at any time and for any reason that it can 
assert to be in the best interests of creditors or others interested in the estate, an unsupervised 
personal representative will be subject to the wishes of the court in relation to bond, inventory, 
and accounting r~quirements. 
147. 1980 Mo. Legis. Serv. (Vernon) 637 (effective Jan. 1, 1981). 
148. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.153 (Vernon 1956). 
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fees 149 and provides that additional, reasonable compensation may 
be allowed without demonstration of extraordinary services. Also, it 
fixes parameters for the aggregate compensation of two or more joint 
or successor representatives. 15° For estate attorneys, the provision 
requires the same minimum fees as are provided for estate represen-
tatives and also permits higher reasonable allowances without regard 
to extraordinary services. It prohibits double fees for an attorney 
who also serves as personal representative, and authorizes reduction 
or denial of compensation for any failure of performance as repre-
sentative. It also mandates denial of any attorney's fee upon a find-
ing of "wrong, improper or injurious" conduct by the attorney. 
Finally, to assure that every estate has an attorney, the fee section 
directs that a personal representative who is not an attorney must be 
represented in court by an attorney, and specifies that the attorney 
cannot be the personal representative's salaried employee. 
With this extraordinarily complete and candid guaranty of attor-
neys' fees for probate work already established by statute, the enact-
ment of a system of independent administration 151 recommended by 
the Missouri State Bar Association posed the question of why the 
lawyers wanted any change. The lawyers were not concerned that 
the statutory fee arrangement might be leading to probate avoidance 
and the associated loss of fees; otherwise, they would not have rec-
ommended that the statutory fee arrangement be extended to un-
supervised estates. 152 Nor were they attempting to increase their fees 
by assuming the traditional role of probate court personnel in deter-
mining what fees in excess of the statutory minima are reasonable; 
one of the new independent administration sections states that the 
minimum fee cannot be exceeded without a court order. 153 
Instead, Missouri lawyers were interested in subterfuge. They 
supported a new "independent administration" statute that violated 
the principles of the UPC and contradicted even the basic notion 
that independent administration is disconnected from the court. The 
statute did not significantly promote efficiency or lower costs. It 
149. Minimum fees are determined by a six point scale of percentages of certain estate 
assets. Land in an estate is not a part of the probate assets to which the percentage scale 
applies unless it is sold pursuant to court order during the course of administration. -- -
ISO. The aggregate compensation for two or more representatives is required to be twice 
the normal minimum fee, but no more than five percent of the asset base. This five percent 
ceiling is perforated, however, by language sanctioning added fees for extraordinary services 
or for court directed possession of estate real property by the fiduciaries. 
151. Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 473.780 to .843 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
152. See Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 473.823 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
153. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.823(3) (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
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makes independent administration available only through conven-
tional opening procedures. 154 Bond requirements for independent 
fiduciaries are the same as for estates in supervised proceedings, 155 
inventories are required to be filed in court, 156 and closing state-
ments that include a complete accounting of all estate receipts and 
disbursements must be filed with the court. 157 Finally, the preserva-
tion of fixed minimum fees and court control of fee adjustments con-
tradicts the UPC purposes of encouraging fee agreements, fee 
competition, and associated fee reductions. 158 Thus, the new statute 
preserves the probate bar's extraordinary monopoly in the probate 
sector and perpetuates a very comfortable, statutory minimum com-
pensation for its work. 
But why would the bar work to amend statutes if no changes 
result? The answer is obvious: probate law reform has been in the 
air. The lawyers apparently concluded that it was advantageous to 
sponsor elaborate amendments to ·their code that could be said to 
adopt the major recommendations of the Uniform Probate Code, but 
which left their probate fees undisturbed. In addition, they may 
have wanted the statutory fee schedule as a safe haven from probate 
court personnel who, in response to public cries for relief from high 
fees, might have begun or intensified efforts to check the lawyers' 
work and compensation. 
So much for the likelihood that the Missouri amendments will 
achieve a UPC purpose of encouraging fee agreements, fee competi-
tion, and associated fee reductions. :Missouri's probate law will re-
main inconsistent with the UPC's procedural reforms until the 
Missouri legislature repeals the 1955 fee statute and allows survivors 
to handle their own uncontested probate matters, with or without 
legal or other assistance. 
Missouri's independent administration does offer some technical 
advantages over conventional proceedings. The principal advan-
tages are that: (I) the procedure affords escape from court appointed 
appraisers for an estate; 159 (2) during a defined period the probate 
154, Missouri's independent administration procedure becomes available in connection 
with conventional opening proceedings of the notice-after-probate type. Unless the will autho-
rizes or directs independent administration, the consent of all apparent successors - devisees 
or heirs - is required. Mo. ANN, STAT. § 473.780 (Vernon Supp. 1981). Presumably, the 
required consent must be recited in the petition; the statute does not specify special formalities, 
155. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 473.157 (Vernon 1956 & Supp. 1981). 
156. Mo, ANN. STAT.§ 473.793 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
157. Mo. ANN, STAT,§ 473.840 (Vernon Supp. 1981), 
158. See text at note 62 supra. 
159. Mo, ANN. STAT. § 473.797 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
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court, though retaining jurisdiction of an unsupervised estate, cannot 
issue any orders relating to administration unless requested by an 
interested person;160 (3) independent :fiduciaries have broad statutory 
administrative powers that include the power to sell land at private 
sale;161 (4) an independent personal representative is protected 
against both personal liability on contracts that are proper business 
for an estate and liability in tort arising from control of estate assets 
where no personal fault is involved;162 (5) an independent represen-
tative may possess land in an estate without court order;163 and (6) 
final accounts that must be prepared and filed in court need not be 
accompanied by vouchers to support claimed disbursements. 164 
Even these technical advantages may be partially offset by weak-
nesses in the new statute. First, a serious title problem arises from an 
independent representative's power to sell without court order be-
cause the statute does not protect a purchaser who fails to ascertain 
that the selling :fiduciary is acting improperly, even where the impro-
priety of the action is not obvious. Supervised executors have also 
been permitted to make sales prior to court approval of final ac-
counts, but only if the power to sell is contained in the will. If Mis-
souri title experts decide to approve unsupervised sales without 
waiting for court approval of final accounts, 165 then the failure of the 
new independent administration procedure to provide adequate pur-
chaser protection arguably is no problem. The new statutory author-
ity to sell without court order should be as effective as has been 
customary for powers in probated wills. 
Second, distributees who receive land from an independent 
fiduciary face a title problem because the statute does not protect 
persons who buy from the distributees. An estate distribution that 
has not been approved by binding court order may be erroneous; the 
possibility of error clouds the title. If the estate is intestate and there 
has been no binding adjudication determining the heirs, the prospect 
of an omitted heir haunts the title. If the estate is controlled by a 
will, doubts whether the will was properly construed and effectuated 
by the distribution may arise. 
160. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.787(2) (Vernon Supp. 1981). However, the court may inter-
vene when an independent fiduciary fails to close the administration within one year or to 
obtain an extension. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 473.843 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
161. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 473.810 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
162. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 473.820 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
163. Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 473.803 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
164. Mo. ANN, STAT.§ 473.840 (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
165. This has been the practice of Missouri title experts. It is unclear, however, whether 
this practice will continue under the new independent administration procedures. 
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If an independent representative's final account, proposed distri-
bution, 166 and closing statement remain unquestioned, then the 
fiduciary is released.167 Perhaps Missouri title experts will conclude 
that a kind of protection against title defects arises at that time. If 
they do, the utility of independent administration will be enhanced. 
It would require, however, a change in the title experts' habit of 
avoiding risks of title whenever possible. 
These shortcomings suggest that Missouri's independent admin-
istration is inadequate where real estate is involved; judicial sale pro-
ceedings and judicially settled final accounts and distributions will 
probably accompany use of the new procedure as a matter of routine 
when land is involved. If this proves to be the case, the new proce-
dure simply provides Missouri lawyers with a few more uneconomi-
cal procedural wrinkles to use, as they see fit, while continuing the 
old probate game. All things considered, the Missouri venture to-
ward independent administration appears not to contribute signifi-
cantly to greater probate efficiency or lower probate costs. 
Kansas. Pressure in the early seventies to enact the Uniform Pro-
bate Code moved the Kansas Judicial Council, in October 1972, to 
designate a probate law study committee to consider probate law re-
form.168 The committee decided that the fundamental UPC reforms 
were precluded by a Kansas Supreme Court decision 169 that had 
overturned a probate proceeding in which statutory notice require-
ments had not been met. 17° Conceding for the sake of argument that 
the Kansas and the United States Constitutions require a fully no-
ticed proceeding to open an estate, this form of opening procedure 
does not necessarily entail a supervised administration and an adju-
166. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 473.840(2)(4)-(5), -.840(4) (Vernon Supp. 1981). 
167. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 473.840(6) (Vernon Supp. 1981) provides: "If no proceeding in-
volving the independent personal representative is filed in the court within one year after the 
statement of account is filed, the representative thereby is discharged from further claim or 
demand by any interested party." The section contains no declaration that the estate as dis-
tributed is settled when the fiduciary is discharged. 
168. See 48 KAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL BULL. 81, 81 (1974). 
169. See In re Estate of Barnes, 212 Kan. 502, 512 P.2d 387 (1973) (failure of executor to 
exercise due diligence in notifying heirs of probate proceedings violates due process). 
170. See Hearrell, Probate Law -A Study and Proposals, 48 KAN. Juo1CIAL COUNCIL 
BuLL. 82, 83, 87-88 (1974). The inference in this report that constitutional barriers or concerns 
led the group to reject UPC's procedural reco=endations is confirmed in a letter to the au-
thor from Richard Morse, a nonlawyer member of the Probate Law Study Advisory Commit-
tee, dated February 21, 1975: "One of our major concerns was in regard to sufficiency of 
notice and due process under the UPC. The In Re Barnes decision, 212 Kan. 505, had a major 
bearing on our action." A copy of this letter is on file with the Michigan Law Review. The 
co=ittee's curious view of Barnes is discussed in Wellman, Arkansas and the Un!form Pro-
bate Code: Some Issues and Answers, 2 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. I, 32 (1979). 
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dicated closing; a fully noticed opening was combined with un-
supervised administration in Wisconsin, 171 for example. 
In any event, the committee recommended, and the Kansas legis-
lature dutifully enacted, an addendum to the Kansas Probate Code 
called the "Simplified Estates Act."172 The descriptive section im-
plies that something other than supervised administration is in-
volved, for a petition seeking application of the act requires the court 
to determine ''whether the estate shall be administered as a simpli-
fied estate or as a supervised estate ."173 But, a fiduciary appointed 
under the new act must post bond174 and file an inventory, 175 lacks 
power to sell real estate without court order, 176 and must file an ac-
count and distribute according to the court's final order. 177 Obvi-
ously, the act offers only a puzzle as to why anyone would use the 
new procedure, which involves a special inquiry by the court into 
why standard procedures are not being followed. 
The Kansas legislation is without merit. It is an example of de-
laying tactics by probate insiders who were pushed to recommend 
changes in legislation they thought should be left undisturbed. 
B. .District of Columbia: Probate Reform in Reverse 
The District of Columbia Probate Reform Act of 1980178 is dis-
tinctly worse than the statutes of Indiana, Missouri, and Kansas, 
which do little or nothing to relieve the public of excessive procedu-
ral protections and costs in probate. While the new D.C. statute con-
tains some elements of the UPC, it actually increases court 
involvement in estates. The following discussion explores the legis-
lative background behind this surprising development in an effort to 
determine whether the enactment portends greater supervision of es-
tates in other jurisdictions. 
D.C. Law 3-72 originated in the late 1960s when an ad hoc com-
mittee of prominent Washington lawyers began to compare prelimi-
171. See text at note 118 supra; Wellman, supra note 4, at 463-72 (1970). 
172. Kansas Simplified Estates Act, ch. 299, §§ 29-34, 1975 Kan. Sess. Laws 836 (codified 
at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-3201 to -3206 (1976)). 
173. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3202 (1976) (emphasis added). 
174. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3203(b) (1976). 
175. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-3204 (1976). 
176. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-3204 with KAN. STAT. ANN.§§ 59-1407, -1410, -2301 
to -2322 (1976). 
177. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-3205 with KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-2247, -2248 (1976). 
178. District of Columbia Probate Reform Act of 1980, D.C. L. No. 3-72 (May 7, 1980) 
(effective June 24, 1980) (to be codified in D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107 to -1305) [hereinafter 
cited as D.C. Probate Reform Act, with reference to subsections infature codification). 
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nary drafts of the Uniform Probate Code and other probate 
legislation and to draft legislation to reform the District's rules. This 
work culminated in the introduction in late 1973 of S. 2826 in the 
93rd Congress, which was reintroduced as Bill 1-142 in the District 
Council of the District of Columbia following the advent of home 
rule in 1974. Active study of the proposal began in mid-1977. By 
then a bill adapting the Uniform Probate Code to the District also 
had been introduced. In early 1980, following public hearings, a 
consultant's analyses, and circulation of three draft bills, a bill based 
on S. 2826 as changed in committee emerged and was promptly 
passed.179 
The original proposal by the ad hoc lawyer group would have 
brought the essence of the UPC's articles III and IV to the District. 
The bill offered an optional "administrative probate" procedure that 
embodied the advantages of the UPC's informal probate and ap-
pointment procedures: it permitted probate of a will without ad-
vance notice to heirs or production of attesting witnesses, and quick 
appointment of an estate fiduciary. 180 The bill also provided an in-
formal administration procedure similar to the UPC's: it gave all 
personal representatives extensive statutory powers - including the 
power to sell and convey land - that could be exercised without 
special court orders.181 These procedures for quick openings and the 
broad statutory powers for fiduciaries were the bill's most radical 
changes. In addition, court filed inventories, appraisals, and ac-
counts by personal representatives were made unnecessary if all suc-
cessors signed and filed a waiver. 182 Thus, an administration could 
be accomplished with a minimum of court supervision. The bill also 
specifically provided that a waiver could be effectively withdrawn by 
any interested party at any time, thereby changing an administration 
from independent to supervised status. 183 Finally, the bill included 
adequate provisions for the protection of purchasers from personal 
representatives or their distributees and limitations settling distrib-
uted estates against claims of improper administration or distribu-
179. See COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, REPORT ON BILL 3-91, THE D.C. PRO-
BATE REFORM ACT OF 1980, 1-2, 14, 18 (March 12, 1980) [hereinafter cited as D.C. COUNCIL 
REPORT] (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
180. S. 2826, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., § 201, 119 Cong. Rec. 42,382 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 
Senate Bill] (proposing new D.C. CODE§§ 20-507, -512). (On file with the Michigan Law 
Review.) 
181. Senate Bill, supra note 180 (proposing new D.C. CODE§ 20-916). 
182. Senate Bill, supra note 180 (proposing new D.C. CODE§ 20-919). 
183. Senate Bill, supra note 180 (proposing new D.C. CODE§ 20-919(b)). 
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tion. 184 
As finally enacted, D.C. Law 3-72 retains some of the features of 
the original lawyers' bill. The new law provides an optional "abbre-
viated probate" procedure, under which wills may be probated and 
estates opened without advance notice, elaborate proofs or judicial 
hearings. 185 The role of the fiduciary, whether he is appointed in an 
"abbreviated probate" or a 'judicial probate" opening proceeding, is 
defined by many provisions derived from the UPC including provi-
sions for general fiduciary duties to administer and distribute the es-
tate, broad statutory powers, and supporting purchaser protection. 186 
But the resemblance to the UPC stops here. In spite of the adop-
tion of several elements of the UPC, the new law actually increases 
court involvement in estates. There is no power to sell real estate 
without court order. 187 The ability of successors under the old pro-
cedures to waive the requirement of court filed inventories and ac-
counts 188 is narrowed almost to extinction; waiver is permitted only 
when all successors are also serving as co-personal representatives. 189 
Furthermore, the most that can be accomplished by waiver by suc-
cessors anxious to control probate delays and cost is to reduce the 
Register's review of the account from "a formal Court audit" to "a 
cursory review to determine if the inventories and accounts appear 
regular on their face and are supported by reasonable documenta-
tion." 190 Court personnel will determine what distinctions, if any, 
are to be attached to these highly subjective formulae. 191 
Fiscal estimates accompanying the Judiciary Committee's Report 
184. Senate Bill, supra note 180 (proposing new D.C. CODE§§ 20-918, -1503). 
185. D.C. Probate Reform Act, supra note 178, at§ 20-311. 
186. See, e.g., D.C. Probate Reform Act,supra note 178, at§§ 20-505, -701 to -705, -741 to 
-744. 
187. Compare the new D.C. CODE§ 20-916(w) proposed in Senate Bill, supra note 180, 
with the provisions of the D.C. Probate Act, supra note 178, that are to be codified at D.C. 
CODE §§ 20-74l(u) and 20-742(b). 
188. A "special bond" provision had long enabled many estates to escape court-supervised 
inventory and accounting requirements. Under the old procedure an estate could escape these 
requirements with the consent of all heirs or residuary devisees and an assumption of full and 
unlimited liability by the consenting successors for all known and all unknown estate liabili-
ties. See D.C. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 179, at 31-33. 
189. D.C. Probate Reform Act, supra note 178, at§ 20-73l(a). 
190. D.C. Probate Reform Act, supra note 178, at§ 20-73l(b). 
191. The distinction between a "formal Court audit" and the new "cursory review" proce-
dure is discussed in D.C. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 179, at 56; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
BAR - D.C. COURT SYSTEM STUDY COMMITTEE, FIDUCIARY, PROBATE, AND TAX REPORT 
27-28 (Committee Draft dated Sept. 11, 1979) (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (herein-
after cited as HORSKY COMMITTEE REPORT]; and Memorandum from District of Columbia 
Bankers Association to David Clark, Chairperson of the Council of the District of Columbia 
Committee on the Judiciary (May 4, 1980) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). The mem-
orandum observed: 
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that preceded enactment of the new law indicate that the new ac-
counting requirement will require fiduciaries of "the vast majority" 
of estates, as contrasted with the historic sixty percent of estates, to 
file accounts that will be subject to the "cursory review" proce-
dure.192 Consequently, five new positions costing an estimated 
$68,849 in additional salaries, will probably have to be added to the 
staff of the Register of Wills. However, the estimates also indicate 
that increased collections from filing fees charged by the Probate Di-
vision of the Superior Court will more than cover the costs of the 
new staff.193 Thus, the new procedure directly increases probate 
costs. 
The requirement that practically all estate fiduciaries file inven-
tories and appraisals of estate assets was made additionally onerous 
by two other changes that crept into the enacted bill. One change, 
relatively innocuous in the context of the D.C. lawyers' original rec-
ommendation that would have made filed inventories unusual, 
brings estate land under the responsibility of probate fiduciaries and, 
thus, extends probate court supervision to all real estate in estates. 194 
Land must now be appraised in every estate, 195 and significant new 
appraisal costs will result. 
Second, the lawyers' original recommendation included escape 
from court-appointed appraisers; fiduciaries could have selected any 
qualified appraiser.196 However, as enacted, estate :fiduciaries must 
convince the Register or the court that there is "good cause" why an 
appraiser other than one from a court-approved list should be 
used. 197 Fiduciaries who select an appraiser without approval run 
the risk that the appraiser's fee will be disallowed as an estate ex-
pense. Also, there is a risk that an official appraiser will have to be 
In order to define and delimit "cursory review" and "reasonable documentation," the 
phrase "as shall be determined by rule of Court" should be added at the end of this 
sentence. 
The reco=ended addition to the language of D.C. CODE§ 20-732 did not find its way into 
the bill as enacted. 
192. See D.C. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 179, at 92. 
193. These fees range from 0.5% of small estate values down to 0.05% of estate values in 
excess of one million dollars. Much smaller rates applied to the eliminated special bond proce-
dures. New revenues also will be generated by the new law's extension of probate court super-
vision to all real estate in estates, thus subjecting the value of the estate realty to the percentage 
rates in the new filing fee structure. Previously, only the proceeds from real estate sold during 
administration were subject to probate controls and fees. D.C. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 
179, at 92-93. 
194. See note 193 supra. 
195. D.C. Probate Reform Act, supra note 178, at §§ 20-105, -711. 
196. Senate Bill, supra note 180 (proposing new D.C. CODE § 20-907). 
197. D.C. Probate Reform Act, supra note 178, at§ 20-712. 
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engaged to repeat the appraisal. Obviously, the court's system of ap-
proving appraisers has been made more important by the new law. 
The enacted measure also contains extensive provisions dealing 
with fees for personal representatives and attorneys. 198 It requires a 
court determination of fees in every case. Undoubtedly, this com-
forted some consumer advocates who sought relief from the old D.C. 
law that simply set fiduciary and attorney fees at ten percent of the 
value of personal assets, a rigid and unusually high rate compared 
with other statutory rates around the country.199 But, in addition to 
the power to fix fees, the new law gives court personnel authority to 
determine whether fee requests are "accompanied by verified docu-
mentation" showing that five criteria for controlling fees have been 
met. The guidelines are anything but precise. Further, the claimant 
must send a copy of the fee request and supporting documentation to 
all interested persons200 Thus, considerable work, as well as addi-
tional charges for time spent, will be involved in complying with the 
procedure. 
The elaborate nature of the procedures and especially the proba-
ble costs of protesting requested fees seem very likely to chill benefi-
ciary interest in making such protests. Hence, the effectiveness of the 
system to control fees depends almost entirely on the performance of 
the Register of Wills Office. The outlook of the personnel there is 
almost inevitably closer to the professional fiduciaries and lawyers 
- fellow technicians who understand the law - than to survivors. 
Ironically, the procedure therefore seems destined only to sanction 
the rates set by lawyers for the additional work made necessary by 
the District's extravagant efforts to eliminate sin or error from the 
succession process. 
Persons interested in probate reform should note the factors in 
the movement from the independent administration system proposed 
in the original D.C. lawyers' bill to the super-supervised system that 
emerged from the legislative process six years later. One important 
factor was the "Probate Reform Comparison Chart,"201 a report pre-
198. D.C. Probate Reform Act, supra note 178, at§ 20-751. 
199. D.C. COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 179, at 62, referring to D.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
1705(5) (1973). Probate fees in the District of Columbia have attracted considerable attention 
in recent literature. See P. STERN, supra note 2, at 35 (reporting fee allowances to D.C. pro-
bate lawyers of $6,077 for a $60,774.24 estate, and $4,751.69 for an estate appraised at 
$47,516.95). 
200. D.C. Probate Reform Act, supra note 178, at§ 20-751. 
201. The D.C. Project, Probate Reform Comparison Chart (April 1978) (prepared by 
Thomas Farah of the Legislative Research Center, Georgetown University Law Center, for 
David Clarke, chairperson of the D.C. Council's Committee on the Judiciary) (on file with the 
Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Comparison Chart]. 
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pared for the D.C. Council's judiciary committee. The document 
summarily condemned the major procedural recommendations in 
the original D.C. lawyers' bill that tended to expand testator-succes-
sor control. For example, the report condemned the UPC principle 
that no probate bonds should be required unless beneficiaries de-
mand bond. The report stated that the principle "created an unjusti-
fied risk to all parties concemed."202 There is no explanation or 
elaboration. 
Similarly, the report rejected the UPC's position that where an 
estate is not opened, unsecured claims against the estate should be 
barred three years from death without the notice to claimants that 
would have been given had the estate been opened. The report ex-
plained that such a provision "would reward delay."203 Evidently, 
the staff concluded that successors could defeat creditors by failing to 
open estate administration. But creditors can initiate administration 
to protect themselves from delay. A creditor who fails to initiate ad-
ministration within the three-year period, whether as a result of lack 
of inclination or failure to note that the debtor has died, is at the 
least negligent, and may not deserve legal protection. 
The report rejected the existing D.C. "special bond" provision 
that excused court-filed inventories and accounts. The staff con-
demned this procedure as "illogical" because it required heirs to as-
sume unlimited personal liability for estate debts.204 This conclusion 
did not address how a procedure can be illogical when it can only be 
applied with the express written consent of those affected. Presuma-
bly, anyone consenting to the special bond procedure was aware of 
the risk and considered it offset by the attendant advantages. 
After discarding the special bond procedure, the staff recom-
mended that court-filed inventories and accounts be required for 
every estate. They reasoned that estate fiduciaries must maintain es-
tate records in order to provide statements of assets and accounts to 
beneficiaries demanding information. From this they leaped to the 
conclusion that court filing would involve so little additional expense 
or bother that successors should have the benefit of "the enormous 
value inventories and accounts offer beneficiaries, especially . . . in 
the framework of a system which places the burden on the benefi-
ciaries to come forward to oppose actions of the fiduciary."205 It is 
hard to imagine a clearer revelation of the belief, shared by many 
202. Comparison Chari, supra note 201, at 3. 
203. Id. at 5-6. 
204. Id. at 7-8. 
205. Id. at 12. 
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probate court officials, that estate beneficiaries simply will be with-
out effective protection unless the courts meticulously check the do-
ings of fiduciaries, no matter who they are or who selects them. 
The report also concluded that a personal representative should 
not be able to sell estate realty without a court order, apparently 
even where such power was expressly granted by the testator. The 
stated justification for this position is mechanical and incomplete. 
The staff started with the assumption that the fiduciary's bond must 
be increased to cover the proceeds of any land sale. From this, they 
reasoned that unless a fiduciary is forced to obtain a court order 
before selling real estate, there is no mechanism to assure that the 
bond increase would be in place before the sale was made. 206 How-
ever, they ignored provisions in the old and new law that permit the 
required probate bond to be reduced below the normal statutory 
amount by testator or beneficiary waivers. They also ignored statu-
tory formulae and procedures having no connection to the fiduci-
ary's power of sale that could be applied to mandate an increase in 
bond when necessary to cover a land sale. 
There is another anomaly here. The staff recommendation and 
the newly enacted statute narrow the question in a land sale proceed-
ing to whether bond has been increased sufficiently to match the 
market value of the land;207 other questions surrounding the sale do 
not seem to be proper for the court to consider. This raises the inter-
esting question-of whether a surety's interest in obtaining an addi-
tional bond premium might be used to circumvent a provision in a 
will that purports to prohibit the sale of certain real estate. 
The District's probate court officials did not entrust their cause 
against independent administration to the Probate Reform Compari-
son Chart, however. Probate court officials prepared documents op-
posing the independent administration proposals of the original ad 
hoc committee, explaining that court supervision of estates should be 
tightened rather than relaxed. The statements were directed to a 
D.C. bar committee charged with preparing a fiduciary, probate, and 
tax report as a part of a D.C. court system study.208 Superior Court 
206. Id. at 22. 
207. D.C. Probate Reform Act, supra note 178, states that§ 20-742(b) provides: 
In order to invest in, sell, exchange, or lease real property, the personal representative 
shall obtain a Court order. The court shall give this order upon certification by the per-
sonal representative that the penalty amount of the bond has been expanded by an 
amount equal to the fair market value of the real estate as appraised pursuant to sub-
chapter II of chapter 7. Adjustments to the expanded penalty amount may be made by 
the Court after the proposed transaction. . 
208. Memorandum from Margaret A. Haywood, Judge, Superior Court of the District of 
Columbia, addressed to the D.C. Court System Study Committee of the D.C. Bar (undated) 
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Judge Margaret Haywood and Register of Wills Peter McLaughlin 
rested their case for increased supervision on their view that the 
quality of work in too many District probates already was abysmally 
low, and that a withdrawal of court supervision would make matters 
worse. Judge Haywood's comments were particularly sharp. 
[T]here are lawyers whose lack of expertise is appalling .... Nothing 
exists in the law, or procedure, or standards for practice, to serve as an 
eliminator [sic] and any lawyer is eligible to enter upon counselling the 
administration of an estate. The bungling and fumbling that goes on is-
beyond belief, and the instances of erroneous distribution, unautho-
rized disbursements, failures in adherence to rules of procedure, dila-
tory compliances, and other serious mishaps, designed or inadvertant 
. . . are legion. 209 
Register McLaughlin supported the judge's general statement with 
twenty-six cases involving serious errors of administration or distri-
bution. He added that "[f]ortunately for all parties, the errors are 
discovered by our staff and, ordinarily, are corrected and all persons 
are made whole before it is too late."210 
(concerning .Dreft Report of the Fiduciary, Probate, and Tax Subcommillee, supra note 191) 
[hereinafter cited as Judge Haywood's Memorandum]; letter and attached memorandum from 
Peter J. McLaughlin, Register and Clerk, Office of Register of Wills and Clerk of the Probate 
Division, Superior Court of the District of Columbia, to Samuel F. Harahan, Director, District 
of Columbia Court System Study Committee of the District of Columbia Bar (May 24, 1979) 
[hereinafter cited as Register McLaughlin's Memorandum]. Copies of these documents are on 
file with the Michigan Law Review. 
209. Judge Haywood's Memorandum, supra note 208, at 2. 
210. Register McLaughlin's Memorandum, supra note 208, at 4-7. Descriptions as pro-
vided by Register McLaughlin in the first ten of the twenty-six cases listed in his memorandum 
are reproduced here for illustrative purposes: 
Attorney/fiduciary paid over $4,000 funeral expenses in an insolvent estate. (By law, the 
maximum allowable payment in such a case is $600 to $1,000). 
Distribution of several thousand dollars was not made to a particular legatee because he is 
now deceased. (Legatee survived the decedent, and his estate would be entitled to legacy), 
Although the will specifically states distribution of estate assets to minors should be made 
to named trustees for benefit of the minors, the legacies were shown payable directly to 
the minors. 
Distribution of$1 l,0OO was shown payable to decedent's widow ignoring docketed claims 
totalling over $70,000. 
Distribution of surplus of intestate estate was shown payable to two brothers of decedent, 
the attorney/fiduciary steadfastly maintaining that he could ignore a third brother whose 
whereabouts had been unknown for two years. (His share would be paid into the Court 
Registry pending his return.) 
Fiduciary, decedent's only child, claimed reimbursement for funeral expenses when, in 
fact, decedent's widower had paid bill. 
Executors claimed that a commission of fifteen percent (15%) (ten percent (10%) is the 
maximum allowed by law), reported joint property (which would pass outside probate to 
the joint owner), and made a notation in the account that decedent's home would have to 
be sold to pay decedent's debts, when, in fact, the house was owned as tenants by the 
entirety and not subject to decedent's debts. 
In an insolvent estate, attorney/fiduciary showed payment only to creditors who had pro-
bated claims, ignoring many others of whom he knew and acknowledged. 
Intestate estate showed distribution solely to decedent's widow, ignoring decedent's four-
teen year old minor child. 
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The statements of Judge Haywood and Register McLaughlin 
plainly impressed the court system study committee. It issued a draft 
report a few months later reversing its prior support of independent 
administration.211 The Haywood-McLaughlin statements also 
swayed public opinion. The Washington Bar Association, an organi-
zation of black lawyers, and a D.C. Bar Association citizens' advi-
sory committee of thirty-three nonlawyers quickly picked up the 
statements. They urged revision of the pending probate bill accord-
ing to the recommendations of the probate officials "to protect con-
sumers and to provide for freedom of information."212 
Spokesmen for independent administration noted flaws in the 
widespread arguments against their position. They pointed out that 
the recommended "cursory review" of accounts in all cases would be 
tantamount to a requirement of court audit since an account submit-
ted for "cursory review" must be "supported by reasonable docu-
mentation."213 Why, they asked, should the law subject all estates to 
the delays and administrative costs of court audits and court supervi-
sion generally when all of the data indicated that most fiduciaries-
attorneys appear to act flawlessly?214 Also, they noted that since in-
Distribution was shown payable directly to a hopelessly incompetent person. (A conser-
vator must be appointed to receive his share.) 
211. See HORSKY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 191, at 23: "For the protection of all 
parties, all estates should be subject to a reasonable review with reasonable documentation to 
protect both fiduciaries and the citizenry from mistakes in this very technical field." 
212. Letter from Citizens' Advisory Committee to David Clarke, Chairperson, D.C. Coun-
cil Committee on the Judiciary, 1-2 (Aug. 3, 1979); Letter from J. Clay Smith, President, The 
Washington Bar Association, to Charles A. Horsky, Chairman, Court Systems Study Commit-
tee (Aug. 7, 1979) (copies on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
213. See memorandum from Virginia L. Riley, Chairperson, Steering Committee, Divi-
sion VIII (Trusts, Estates Probate) D.C. Bar, to David Clarke, Chairperson, D.C. Council 
Committee on the Judiciary (March 4, 1980) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). At page 
5, the memorandum criticizes what soon was to be enacted as§ 20-732 of the D.C. Code. The 
memorandum observes: 
Subsection (b) attempts to provide for the type of review of accountings to be con-
ducted by the Court in lieu of a formal audit, in those cases where all heirs and legatees 
have filed appropriate waivers. The reference in this subsection to "reasonable documen-
tation" could be cited by the Court as justification for requiring the filing of all cancelled 
checks, receipted bills and bank records, as is now reguired under a formal audit. Thus 
there would be no point in obtaining the waivers ofherrs and legatees to the formal audit. 
214. See letter from Doris D. Blazek, member, Steering Committee, Division VIII (Trusts, 
Estates & Probate) D.C. Bar, to Gregory E. Mize, Staff Director, D.C. Counsel Committee on 
the Judiciary (Dec. 26, 1978) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). The letter states: 
Whether or not the District of Columbia should move in the direction of less super-
vised administration is not a question subject to one clear answer. Those who favor court 
supervision desire a system designed to protect beneficiaries from that fiduciary who is the 
"rotten apple in the barrel." In order to prevent misappropriation or diversion of assets in 
that exceptional estate, all estates will be subject to delays and greater administrative 
costs. Others suggest that it is more important to make the administrative process as easy 
as possible for beneficiaries and heirs, and the risk of a dishonest or irresponsible fiduciary 
must simply be accepted in favor of the overall good conferred by facilitating the process. 
A number of jurisdictions have determined to follow the latter course, which must be 
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dependent administration does not disturb basic accountability by 
estate fiduciaries to beneficiaries, it will not leave them uninformed, 
or deprive them of inventories and accounts.215 Since the benefi-
ciaries are informed, why should the court intervene if the benefi-
ciaries are entirely satisfied?216 In a supervised proceeding the court 
examines all papers that are required to be filed, regardless of the 
satisfaction of the fiduciary-successor group. There may be no dis-
pute to generate interest in and thought about how the law should 
apply to the particular case. The court may therefore require correc-
tions for reasons that are significant to it alone. Since there is no 
interest, there will be no appeal of such corrections, and the possibly 
ill-informed lights of probate magistrates become the law by default. 
Even if one assumes that all successors want the law as perceived 
by the probate office to be followed meticulously, the meticulous au-
dits conducted by the Register of Wills Office may be unnecessary. 
Some District lawyers with marginal knowledge of probate law may 
accept estate work counting on the audits to straighten matters out if, 
by chance, their guesswork proves to be wrong. With fees rigidly set 
by law and custom, many survivors simply may not care whether 
their attorney or the Register of Wills Office detects and corrects er-
rors in the handling of their estates. Thus, the audits themselves may 
be creating the apparent need for the audits by encouraging the par-
ticipation of marginally competent lawyers. 
Nevertheless, in the end, "consumer protection" carried the day 
in the District, and a law with "reform" in its title is now on the 
books. It relegates the administration of every District of Columbia 
probate estate to whoever happens to head the Office of the Register 
of Wills. 
Perhaps, the new D.C. law is a political aberration that other ju-
risdictions are unlikely to emulate. The Washington area is unique 
for its large population of lawyers who are primarily concerned with 
federal matters and know little about probate law. Surely it stands 
regarded as the current trend. Advocates of the "paternalistic" or "protectionist" view 
have suggested that that approach is particularly appropriate in the District of Columbia 
since many of the estates are smaller and the people less sophisticated in financial and 
prol?erty matters. There is no basis for such a view, we believe, and we urge adoption of 
ihe informal probate procedures. That will place the District of Columbia in a position to 
be termed a "modem" j_urisdiction for probate procedures. 
215. See Comments of Division VIII Steering Committee (Trusts, Estates & Probate) of 
the District of Columbia Bar to Bill 3-91, "The District of Columbia Probate Reform Act of 
1979," at 2-3 (undated memorandum) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
216. The legislative history of the D.C. bill does not indicate that even the instances of 
fiduciary/attorney bungling described by Judge Haywood and Register McLaughlin were 
viewed as serious problems by the estate successors involved. 
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alone as a city-state where virtually all probate authority is exercised 
by one judge and one register of wills whose practices cannot, there-
fore, be scrutinized by comparisons with practices of similar officials 
in other parts of the jurisdiction. With responsibility for a very busy 
probate office, an apparent reputation for sticking to the book, and a 
singularly undependable probate bar, Register McLaughlin proba-
bly has no comparable counterpart anywhere in the country. Also, 
Washington's brand new, self-rule government has attracted new cit-
izen interest in government, which, while commendable in general, 
can be a source of serious misjudgments in a field like probate where 
generations of accumulated law can, if taken seriously, create a mon-
strous contradiction to the principle of owner control of private 
property. 
Lawyers who have quietly encouraged some unobstrusive form 
of mandatory court proceedings for every probate estate, either to 
eliminate competition or to inflate a job that is usually held by law-
yers, should take note of the D.C. experience. It shows that supervi-
sion of estates is a flexible concept that under the right political 
conditions lends itself to absurd expansion of court authority and 
staff. It can easily lead to elimination of any role for lawyers in un-
contested successions. While UPC formulations may also lead to do-
it-yourself probate, the community stands to gain more from UPC's 
testator-survivor control of estates than from complete public control 
of estates. 
III. INDEPENDENT ADMINISTRATION OR No ADMINISTRATION 
In retrospect, the ad hoc committee of D.C. lawyers may wish 
that they had urged enactment of the UPC text rather than compro-
mise provisions designed to free some estates from some court con-
tacts that impede successor control. The approach they adopted 
conceded that court control was appropriate whenever the successors 
had not consented to the appointed fiduciary. The concession led to 
charges that beneficiaries do not understand the complications of 
fiduciary law and therefore cannot exert adequate control over those 
gaining authority by public appointment. The UPC eliminates the 
need for the concession by giving full control of the identity and 
emergence of an estate fiduciary to the testator and his successors. 
But the D.C. lawyers' judgment that their strategy stood a better 
chance of acceptance than the UPC should not be criticized too hast-
ily. The UPC's procedures may be too radical and complex to have 
been adopted in their entirety in the District of Columbia. But the 
D.C. lawyers' compromise was unsuccessful anyway, despite the 
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work of many influential people. This failure in the District and the 
mixed results in the six other jurisdictions discussed earlier make a 
strong case for a simpler approach that can be more readily under-
stood and is less susceptible to defeat in the political arena. 
If people believe that :fiduciaries should be watched by the courts 
or some adjunct to them, perhaps the simplest route to probate re-
form is to eliminate the fiduciary from routine probate settlements. 
A universal succession procedure would offer a more viable ap-
proach to probate simplification than various approaches to testator-
successor control keyed to a publicly appointed fiduciary.217 As con-
templated by a draft prepared for the Joint Editorial Board for the 
Uniform Probate Code,:218 the universal succession procedure would 
enable intestate heirs or devisees, other than devisees entitled only to 
pecuniary gifts, to accept a succession without administration. A 
named executor would not qualify as a universal successor but might 
block succession without administration by opening a conventional 
administration before potential universal successors accepted a suc-
cession. Accepting successors would assume personal liability for a 
share of the decedent's debts and for any funeral expenses, expenses 
of administration, and pecuniary devises; each successor's liability 
would be proportional to his share of the estate. Accepting succes-
sors would also receive statutory power to create secure titles in pur-
chasers of estate assets during periods within which changes in the 
successor group might still occur.219 The procedure for accepting an 
estate would be similar to the UPC's informal probate and appoint-
ment proceedings. It might be combined with probate of a will or, if 
no personal representative has been appointed, started after a will 
has been probated by either informal or formal procedures. 
The political appeal of this proposal is obvious. The necessary 
legislation could be significantly briefer than formulations based on 
the UPC that describe testator-successor control of administered es-
tates. Furthermore, it would not need elaborate cross-referencing or 
other integration with existing statutes concerning executors, admin-
istrators, and other probate fiduciaries. The universal succession 
concept that a decedent's successors should be able to step into the 
decedent's place vis-a-vis creditors and other claimants is easily un-
217. See Halbach, Probate and Estate Planning: Reducing Need and Cost Through Change 
in the Law, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 165 (E. Halbach ed. 1977); Succession 
Without Administration, UPC NOTES No. IS, at 6 (March 1976); Rheinstein, European Methods 
for the Liquidation of the .Debts of .Deceased Persons, 20 loWA L. REV. 431 (1935). 
218. See Report on Joint Editorial Board far UPC, UPC NOTES No. 24, at 7, 8 (Oct, 1979). 
219. Changes could occur as a result of will contests or discovery of error in the determina-
tion of successors. 
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derstood by lay persons, is familiar to most lawyers, and is presently 
available for important numbers of cases in Louisiana220 and Cali-
fornia221 and, to lesser extents, in other areas of the country.222 More 
work toward implementing this approach is overdue. 
A new uniform law project devoted to succession without admin-
istration has begun. Acting upon recommendations of the Joint Edi-
torial Board for the Uniform Probate Code - which promoted the 
project with encouragement from the Section of Real Property, Pro-
bate, and Trust Law of the American Bar Association and the Amer-
ican College of Probate Counsel - the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has formed a special com-
mittee to draft a "Uniform Succession Without Administration Act." 
The product, which will probably be recommended as a freestanding 
uniform law as well as a new addition to the Uniform Probate Code, 
may be ready by 1982 or 1983. It should restimulate legislative ac-
tivity in the succession area and accelerate the day when most U.S. 
estates will be controlled by those selected by decedents and succes-
sors, rather than by courts and lawyers. 
CONCLUSION 
The only legitimate goal of new legislation touching the old sub-
ject of probate procedure is to lower succession costs, which are no-
toriously higher in the United States than in other countries.223 The 
direct route to this end is legislation that enables successors of a de-
cedent, or executors selected by decedents for the purpose, to receive 
and settle estates without any contact with the court system once 
they have established a public record tending to legitimate their 
claim and attaching responsibility for the control assumed. 
The success of legislative efforts to decrease the role of public 
officials in the routine administration of decedent's estates is mixed. 
A baker's dozen states have enacted the Uniform Probate Code, af-
firming that testator-successor control of estates is preferable to con-
trol by the courts and related offices. Several other states have 
recently enacted legislation that merely changes statutory formulae 
by which court supervision of estates is expressed. This Article has 
220. Sarpy, Probate, Economy and Celerity in Louisiana, 34 LA. L. REV. 523 (1974). 
221. See Spitler, How To Succeed To California Community Property . .. Without Even 
Trying, UPC NOTES No. 18, at 8 (Dec. 1976). 
222. Georgia statutes provide that the surviving spouse of an intestate decedent who is the 
sole heir when there are no surviving descendants of the decedent, may, upon payment of the 
decedent's debts, "take possession of [the estate] without administration." GA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 113-902, -903(1) (1979). 
223. See note 2 supra. 
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examined the details of seven non-UPC enactments that appear to 
offer options between court supervised administration and indepen-
dent administration. Only one of these ventures, the new Michigan 
probate statute, approaches UPC standards for eliminating unneces-
sary procedural requirements. Two others, those in Illinois and Wis-
consin, are disappointing but hold some promise of lower succession 
costs. Enactments in Indiana, Missouri, and Kansas are without 
public benefit. The seventh, the District of Columbia Probate Re-
form Act of 1980, is a serious setback that increases court control of 
estates and promises to increase probate costs for many successors to 
District of Columbia estates. 
The process of expanding statutes so that some estates may es-
cape unnecessary court procedures is technically difficult and politi-
cally hazardous. Proponents of this approach to probate law reform 
should reconsider the possibility of adopting articles III and IV of 
the Uniform Probate Code in their entirety as replacements for pres-
ent procedures. Experience in Minnesota teaches that this form of 
partial enactment of the Uniform Probate Code is a viable route to 
probate reform.224 
Where replacement legislation is impossible, reformers should 
frame amendments and additions to meet the fourteen principles of 
probate procedure isolated from the UPC by this Article. These 
principles off er practical freedom from unnecessary court procedures 
for some estates. Where compromise of the principles is necessary, 
reformers should weigh the different costs to UPC goals of various 
modifications. 
The Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin enactments illustrate that 
the public can benefit from efforts to add independent administra-
tion options to codes in which court supervision remains the norm. 
However, the perils of advocating add-on independent administra-
tion are so serious that American lawmakers should give more atten-
tion to universal succession. This approach appears to be less 
vulnerable to political compromise and contradiction and, as a 
standing alternative to both supervised and independent administra-
tion, might serve in practice to make advocates of fiduciary adminis-
tration of estates more interested in cost-cutting procedures. 
This review of the struggle for probate reform suggests that there 
must be a shortage of persons drafting legislation who are tuned to 
developments in probate procedure and sympathetic to the goal of 
224. Minnesota's enactment of articles I, III and IV of the Uniform Probate Code is dis-
cussed in UPC NOTES No. 8, at 6 (July 1974). See also, Brink, The lln!form Probate Code 
Comes lo Minnesota, 30 BENCH & B. MINN., April 1974, at 18. 
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testator-successor control of the estates. Thought should be given to 
organizing a governmental or nonprofit office charged solely with 
keeping track of the legislative and judicial outpourings that contrib-
ute to the growth and complexity of probate procedure. Persons 
staffing such an office who are charged with and regularly compen-
sated for reporting and evaluating developments in probate legisla-
tion for the benefit of the public might, in time, provide a sorely 
needed new source of legislative expertise in probate. The record 
demonstrates that legislators, because of lack of familiarity with the 
relevant issues and techniques, are sitting ducks when faced with the 
recommendations of probate court personnel and other interest 
groups who prefer to see probate court control of estates perpetu-
ated. The public deserves equal time for its perspective. 
